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STEM CELL AND BIOTECHNOLOGICAL PATENTABILITY AND 
RESEARCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 
Jacqueline Hill Tudor* and Jarrod Tudor† 
ABSTRACT 
Stem cell and biotechnological research is a flourishing industry 
around the globe. The growth of the industry can be attributed to its 
promise to lead to a cure for numerous human diseases that are currently 
considered unconquered. Within this industry, the patentability of 
researched innovations has been a hot topic in the past decade. Through 
the patenting process, the industry itself can be a source of economic 
opportunity for countries willing to extend patent protection for the 
inventions produced by stem cell and biotechnological research. 
Because it takes significant resources for research to produce a 
patentable invention, investors desire assurances that their time and 
money will head a result from which they can benefit, whether that be a 
financial benefit, a status benefit, or some other benefit. Despite the 
medical promises of stem cell and biotechnological research, there are 
concerns in some places around the world such as the European Union 
about potential policy implications that would stem from patenting 
innovations in this industry. These concerns are displayed in the two 
leading sources of law governing stem cell and biotechnological 
research: the European Union’s Directive 98/44/EC and the European 
Patent Convention. 
This Article discusses the patentability of stem cell and 
biotechnological inventions under both European Union law and the 
European Patent Convention. The Article continues by discussing several 
other topics that a practitioner must be familiar with when analyzing a 
patentability issue. A few of these topics include the morality debate, the 
promise of stem cell and biotechnological research, taxation of stem cell-
related products, access to records, legal notice, research funding, and 
the free movement of goods. This Article also examines the key case law 
from both the European Court of Justice as well as the two judicial organs 
of the European Patent Office, the Board of Appeal and the Enlarged 
Board of Appeal, that provide insight into this area of law. Additionally, 
this Article identifies the discrepancies between the law governing stem 
cell research and biotechnological research within the European 
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continent and provides recommendations for greater harmonization 
within these two areas of law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION. 
A. The stem cell research industry. 
With robust investment at play, the stem cell and biotechnology 
industry is a thriving global phenomenon.1 For those participating in this 
industry, it can be an incredibly lucrative opportunity.2 In addition to basic 
research, the industry includes advanced segments such as services for 
storing body tissues, organs, and cells.3 In recent years, human cells have 
become global commodities and the industry has grown exponentially. 
However, increased regulation in certain areas of the globe has created a 
shortage of supply which in turn has created a lucrative market for these 
cells; a market that is largely composed of wealthy individuals and 
satisfied using cells from countries with less regulation. Within this 
market, certain types of cells and human tissue are more easily 
transferred. For example, unfertilized ova are more easily traded across 
countries while oocytes are scarcely traded.4 There is evidence that a gap 
in the human tissue economy exists and that experimental therapies 
involving stem cell technology could lead to a solution to filling this gap.5  
Stem cell research is a segment of biotechnological research that 
promises to lead to cures for some of the world’s most damaging and most 
expensive human diseases, such as cancer and cardiovascular diseases, 
that are currently considered either incurable or untreatable.6 The market 
for stem cell technologies is expected to grow quickly over the next 
several years with one estimate forecasting $7.3 billion in additional 
investment.7 This industry has provided large economic opportunities for 
players choosing to participate. Being that the European Union offers 
protection of inventions through the European intellectual property laws, 
the stem cell industry has experienced a large in the number of 
participating players within Europe.8 As more and more patents are issued 
for stem cell research based inventions, investment in the industry will 
become more enticing because of the potential revenue streams for the 
 
 1. SARAH DEVANY, STEM CELL RESEARCH AND THE COLLABORATIVE REGULATION OF 
INNOVATION 55 (2014); see also id. at 87. 
 2. Id. at 22. 
 3. Maria Fannin, Personal Stem Cell Banking and the Problem with Property, 12 SOCIAL & 
CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 342-343 (2011). 
 4. GOTTWEIS, ET. AL, supra note 5, at 46. 
 5. Id. at 4. 
 6. GOTTWEIS, ET. AL, supra note 5, at 7. See also Eneda Hoxha, Stemming the Tide: Stem Cell 
Innovation in the Myriad-Mayo-Roslin Era, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. t 567-568 (2015). 
 7. ANDREAS HUBEL, ULRICH STORZ, & ALOYS HUTTERMAN, LIMITS OF PATENTABILITY: PLANT 
SCIENCES, STEM CELLS AND NUCLEIC ACIDS 9 (2013). 
 8. JUSTINE PILA & PAUL TORREMANS, EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 3 (2016). 
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investors.9  
According to Margarit, Levy, and Loike, stem cell technologies are 
believed to be in an infancy stage.10 Many factors contribute to the 
obstacles in the way of the growth of stem cell research. First, stem cell 
research firms and other players in the industry will always be competing 
for capital with one another because of the limited number of potential 
investors.11 Furthermore, stem cell research is subject to heavy regulation, 
both in regard to the use of stem cells in research as well as the patents 
derived from said research.12 The patenting process of stem cell research 
discoveries is one of the most controversial topics in intellectual property 
law.13 The controversy stems from the diverse view as to what constitutes 
a human embryo.14  
Much of the current investment in stem cell research is comprised of 
public funds with the investing country trying to increase its strength in a 
knowledge-based economy.15 In 2005, South Korea created the World 
Stem Cell Hub so that it could advance its position in the knowledge-
based economy.16 On the other side of the world, the U.S. has successfully 
used its intellectual property law to aggressively progress the 
biotechnology industry.17  
While many countries around the globe have heavily invested in stem 
cell research, there are risks involved in this form of research. For 
example, biomedical research can be more costly in comparison to other 
scientific fields due to the need for specialized laboratories and 
scientists.18 Further, biomedical research is also riskier in comparison to 
other scientific fields because firms and inventors must spend significant 
resources on trials to protect public health and safety.19 Despite these 
realities, countries are pushing money into the field with the hopes of 
finding cures for previously untreatable human diseases.  
 
 9. Hoxha, supra note 10, at 569. 
 10. Yehezkel Margarit, Orrie Levy, & John Loike, The New Frontier of Advanced Reproductive 
Technology: Reevaluating Modern Legal Parenthood, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 138 (2014). 
 11. GOTTWEIS, supra note 5, at 19. 
 12. HUBEL, supra note 9. 
 13. PILA, supra note 16, at 101. 
 14. AURORA PLOMER & PAUL TORREMANS, EMBRYONIC STEM CELL PATENTS: EUROPEAN LAW 
AND ETHICS 30 (2009). 
 15. GOTTWEIS ET. AL, supra note 5, at 22. 
 16. Id. at 1. 
 17. Id. at 179. 
 18. RAVEESHA GUPTA, HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS PATENTING: INNOVATION VS 
MORALITY 16 (2016). 
 19. Id. at 16. 
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B. International variations. 
There is much debate as to the legal status of the components within 
the human body, including tissues, organs, and cells.20 There is also 
debate as to what constitutes something such as a human embryo.21 This 
debate regarding stem cell research is global in scope with various sides 
including industry players, state interests, consumer advocates, and 
ethical opponents competing for dominance.22 The international 
framework for stem cell research contains much diversity in regard to 
what is considered permissible research activity.23 The International Stem 
Cell Initiative is a global organization charged with standardizing and 
harmonizing the area of stem cell research across the globe.24 Countries 
have responded to the Initiative’s efforts at international harmonization in 
various ways. Responses range from complete prohibitions against all 
research on embryos all the way to explicit endorsement and public 
funding of such research.25  
Comparing Japanese law and European law provides a glance at the 
varying sides of the aforementioned spectrum. The Japanese law has a 
strong concern for the morality of what can potentially be patented; as a 
result, it elects to place limitations on the research it endorses. On the 
other hand, the European law endorses more methods of stem cell 
research.26  
Canada allows for stem cell research to be conducted so long as certain 
requirements are met by the researcher including that the research has 
potential health benefits, there is a system of free and informed consent 
based on full disclosure for donation purposes, respect exists for privacy 
and confidentiality, payment is not made for donation, embryos are not 
created merely for science, and there is respect for human dignity as well 
as physical, spiritual, and cultural dignity.27 Despite these restrictions, 
some major breakthroughs in the field of stem cell research have come 
out of Canada.28  
In China, stem cell research can be performed on spare embryos 
 
 20. Fannin, supra note 4, at 340 
 21. Francoise Baylis & Timothy Krahn, The Trouble with Embryos, 22 SOCIAL STUDIES 32 (2009). 
 22. GOTTWEIS ET. AL, supra note 5, at 4. 
 23. Carl E. Gulbrandsen, Michael Falk, Elizabeth Donley, David Kettner, & Lissa Koop, Legal 
Framework Pertaining to Research Creating or Using Human Embryonic Stem Cells, in HUMAN 
EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS 328 (J. Ororico, S.-C. Zhang, & R. Pedersen eds. 2005). 
 24. DEVANEY, supra note 1, at 22. 
 25. Appendix E: Overview of International Human Embryonic Stem Cell Laws, 34 THE NEW 
ATLANTIS 129 (2012). 
 26. Plomer at 5. 
 27. Appendix E: Overview of International Human Embryonic Stem Cell Laws, 34 THE NEW 
ATLANTIS 130 (2012). 
 28. Id.  
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originally designated for in vitro fertilization, donated gametes, fetal cells 
from abortion, and embryos created by somatic cell nuclear transfer.29 
Stem cell research in Israel is conducted without much controversy and 
the country has a very successful industry.30 
One of the most difficult ethical issues within stem cell research is how 
to compensate those who have made physical donations to the research 
and, if so, to make sure the donations are equal and that donations are 
never made as the result of coercion.31 One approach to compensation is 
an equity-based solution whereby the donor gets a share of the proceeds 
obtained from the successful research project.32 Problematically, women 
who are not in a country with a reliable legal structure, are not covered by 
bioethics laws, not living in a country reflective of a feminist-influenced 
society, and/or lack adequate income could be taken advantage of in these 
donor transactions.33 
Perhaps one international legal and social standard that exists is the 
prohibition against the development, implantation, and research on 
human embryos 14 days after fertilization. Most European countries, as 
well as Region X, and countries Y and Z, follow this standard.34 However, 
although this 14-day rule has been followed since human embryological 
research began in earnest in the 1970s, there is now pressure to move to a 
28-day rule allowing embryos to be kept alive for a longer period of time 
given that the research has advanced with much support from some 
bioethicists.35 Regardless, despite this one example, the variety of cultures 
and social, historical, and religious differences have made it difficult to 
adopt a common set of ethics within the EU to guide biomedical 
research.36 
Being that thirty-five percent of all patent applications with stem cell 
technology as the subject matter are filed with the European Patent Office 
(“EPO”) or the United States Patent and Trademark, it is important to 
understand the EU’s and U.S.’s stances on the morality debate.37  
C. The Morality Debate in the EU. 
The moral status of the human embryo is a constant source of debate 
 
 29. Id. at 131. 
 30. GOTTWEIS ET. AL, supra note 5, at 45. 
 31. DEVANEY, supra note 1, at 57. 
 32. Id. at 107. 
 33. GOTTWEIS ET. AL, supra note 5, at 49. 
 34. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 27. 
 35. A Debate is Needed over Embryo Research Limits, FINANCIAL TIMES (August 8, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/40f521ac-9ef0-11e8-85da-eeb7a9ce36e4.  
 36. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 26. 
 37. Hoxha, supra note 10, at 603-604. 
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among politicians, philosophers, theologians, as well as the average 
citizen.38 Within the EU, the European Group on Ethics, an advisory 
board to the European Commission on matters of science and new 
technologies, is one of the main sources of authority that has spoken to 
the controversy of the morality of patenting stem cell research.39 The 
Group suggests that the moral debate is not just about what is a human 
life, but also about the application of the research and resulting 
therapies.40 Much of the controversy is one of ethics; it is questioned 
whether stem cell research should be conducted when some consider it 
immoral to engage in an activity that leads to the destruction of a human 
embryo.41  
The moral status of the human embryo is a constant source of debate 
among politicians, philosophers, theologians, as well as the average 
citizen.42 The issue of morality in biotech research in Europe likely began 
in the 1980s.43 The debate began focusing on stem cell research conducted 
in Europe at roughly the same time.44 The debate was further stoked in 
1996 when stem cell-related research led to the cloning of Dolly the sheep 
in the United Kingdom.45 There is some evidence that the media continues 
to shape biomedical research policy as such news affects politicians, 
religious representatives, and researchers.46 
Controversy has surrounded human embryonic stem cell research since 
the first scientists extracted an embryo from a human body.47 Many 
unanswered questions remain in this area of research including the 
definitions of “human embryo” and “life.”48 The social construction of 
the human embryo sets the stage for the debate on research and funding 
for stem cell-related activities.49 The fundamental question of whether the 
human embryo could become a person does not have a simple answer, yet 
the answer is crucial because it plays a role in determining the human 
 
 38. R. Alta Charo, Ethical and Policy Considerations in Embryonic Stem Cell Research, in 
HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS 312 (J Ororico, S.-C. Zhang, & R. Pedersen eds. 2005). 
 39. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 23. 
 40. GOTTWEIS ET. AL , supra note 5, at 4. 
 41. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 5. 
 42. R. Alta Charo, Ethical and Policy Considerations in Embryonic Stem Cell Research, in 
HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS 312 (J Ororico, S.-C. Zhang, & R. Pedersen eds. 2005). 
 43. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 28-29. 
 44. Laura Palazzani, Embryo Research in Italy: The Bioethical and Biojuridical Debate, 17 
HUMAN REPRODUCTION AND GENETIC ETHICS 28 (2012). 
 45. GOTTWEIS ET. AL, supra note 21, at 61. 
 46. Cristina Rodriquez Luque, Framing Bioethics: A Decade of Controversy over Stem Cell 
Research in the Spanish Press—El Pais and ABC (1996-2006), 3 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF 
SCIENCE IN SOCIETY 79 (2012). 
 47. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 5. 
 48. Id. at 5. 
 49. PLOMER, supra note 17, at 32. 
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embryo’s legal status.50 Although the assumption is that humans have 
greater value than other living organisms, the potential destruction of a 
human embryo may be justified to help those suffering from a disease.51  
In Europe, the debate is often solved through a balancing test of the 
usefulness of what may be developed from stem cell research on the one-
hand and the severity of the violation of public order on the other.52 In an 
attempt to reduce the controversy associated with stem cell research, 
governments and non-governmental organizations have attempted to 
develop uniform standards for research activities so that scientists are 
better equipped to make personal and professional choices as to what type 
of research should be pursued, where it should be pursued, and how the 
research should be funded.53 
The approach to establishing rights for human embryos has ranged 
from assigning embryos full rights as if it is a human all the way to 
virtually no rights such that it is treated no different than any other cell.54 
In a majority of EU member-states, a human embryo has a unique status 
which exists somewhere between that of less than a full human but more 
than just a cluster of cells.55 Regardless of the different perspectives 
across the EU, the competing ethical views find their way into the law of 
the member-states and therefore the law serves as a reflection of societal 
viewpoints.56  
When a product or process involves the use of internal human material, 
ethical questions arise.57 Critics of biomedical research fear that a living 
organism could be commercialized and seen as a profit opportunity, such 
that health and safety risks are set aside which consequently could cause 
harm to humans.58 By extension, if stem cell research is considered 
immoral, then it would likewise be immoral to patent a resulting 
technology.59 Regardless of the immorality concern, as an example, the 
exclusion of patentability due to a violation of public order or based on 
morality in Europe is rare.60 
 
 50. Id. at 33. 
 51. DEVANEY, supra note 1, at 26. 
 52. HUBEL, supra note 9, at 11. 
 53. Baylis, supra note 25, at 31. 
 54. DEVANEY, supra note 1, at 25. 
 55. PLOMER, supra note 17, at 33. 
 56. Baylis, supra note 25, at 33. 
 57. Tamera Hervey, EU Health Law, in EUROPEAN UNION LAW 642 (Catherine Barnard & Steve 
Peers, eds., 2014). 
 58. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 20. 
 59. Id. at 6. 
 60. HOFFMANN EITLE, THE EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION FOR FOREIGN PRACTITIONERS 58 
(2017). 
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D. The Morality Debate in the U.S. 
What is patentable subject matter is a sign of societal approval.61 
Within stem cell research, morality has been a bigger issue in Europe than 
in the United States, where patents are routinely granted for innovations 
resulting from stem cell research without a concern for morality.62 In 
contrast to European law, U.S. law does not have a specific prohibition 
on stem cell-related patents.63 In fact, isolated stem cells have been 
considered patentable subject matter in the U.S. for many years.64 Some 
believe that since U.S. law is so permissive on the subject of 
biotechnology, U.S. law suggests that life itself may be patentable.65  
Thirty-five percent of all patent applications with stem cell technology 
as the subject matter are filed in the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office and the European Patent Office (“EPO”).66 It should also be noted 
that in the U.S., access to embryonic stem cells is federally monitored 
while extraction of adult stem cells from a patient’s body remains 
unregulated.67 Within the federal regulation, stem cell research is more 
likely to regulated while the resulting therapies are not subject to strict 
regulation.68 
E. The promise of stem cell research. 
Stem cell research is not only a scientific endeavor. The manner of 
performing such research also reflects what is acceptable within the 
political and social realm of a country’s culture.69 What is patentable 
drives scientific research in a particular direction and patent law itself 
serves as a form of encouragement or discouragement.70 Taken together, 
the subject matter that is patentable by a country’s intellectual property 
law is not only designed to promote innovation but also to foster social 
participation and market growth in a particular field.71 
The promise of stem cell research begins with the estimate that 
 
 61. Christopher J. Asakiewicz, Separation of Church and State While Promoting the Progress of 
Biotechnology and Modern Science: Does Morality Have Its Place in United States Patents?, 7 J. INT. 
COMMER. LAW TECHNOL 81 (2012). 
 62. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 5-6. 
 63. HUBEL, supra note 9, at 12. 
 64. ANTOINETTE F. KONSKI, PATENTING STEM CELL TECHNOLOGIES: MAKING A CLAIM 31 
(2013). 
 65. Asakiewicz, supra note 63, at 83. 
 
 67. Jeneen Interlandi, Could This Cell Save Your Life?, 83 CONSUMER REPORTS 38 (2018). 
 68. Id. at 40. 
 69. GOTTWEIS ET. AL, supra note 5, at 11. 
 70. BARNARD & PEERS, supra note 59, at 643. 
 71. PILA, supra note 16, at 3. 
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therapies resulting from such research could help 300 million people in 
the United States, Japan, and the European Union.72 Countries that choose 
to encourage stem cell research by offering patents for its innovations 
often see stem cell research as an avenue that will address problems felt 
by its aging population.73 Stem cell therapies have also been used in 
clinical settings to successfully attack diseases already impacting the 
patient.74  
The biggest promise of stem cell research is that it could lead to organ 
regenerating technologies that can cure damaged or diseased cells in 
humans.75 Both adult and embryonic stem cells can contribute to this big 
promise.76 Besides the ability to attack many diseases, stem cell 
technology can also be used to test and screen certain pharmaceuticals.77 
Thus, using stem cell testing can be an avenue through which a country 
can discourage pharmaceutical testing on animals and humans.78  
The challenge of determining patentability of stem cell research and 
biotechnology, and thus its utility, partially rests on separating what is 
considered nature and what is produced separately by way of human 
invention.79 Specifically, the promise of stem cell technology lies partially 
in the debate between whether biotechnology can produce something that 
is patentable and the uncertain implications of patentability.80 The 
discussion as to whether stem cell research activities can lead to 
patentable inventions also involves weighing the ethical concerns 
associated with commercialization and the potential for life-saving 
therapies.81 What has helped both quell the debate on stem cell research, 
and thus, improve the prospects of stem cell therapies is the fact that other, 
new methods to obtain stem cells for research purposes now exist such as 
obtaining them through somatic cell nuclear transfer, parthenogenesis, 
and/or the inducement of pluripotent stem cells.82  
F. The mechanics of patenting stell cell research innovations in Europe. 
The purpose of a patent is to provide the inventor with exclusive rights 
 
 72. GOTTWEIS ET. AL, supra note 5, at 32. 
 73. Id. at 14-15. 
 74. DEVANEY, supra note 1, at 7. 
 75. Id. at 7. 
 76. PILA, supra note 16, at 101. 
 77. DEVANEY, supra note 1, at 9. 
 78. Id. at 5. 
 79. PILA, supra note 16, at 123. 
 80. Id. at 101-102. 
 81. HUBEL, supra note 9, at 10. 
 82. Id. at 26-28. 
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to the patented subject matter for a limited time period.83 Like elsewhere, 
patents issued in Europe are limited-term monopoly rights for an 
invention whereby the rights are granted by each individual member-
state.84 An inventor seeking a patent in an EU member-state may apply to 
the EPO or to that member-state’s patent office, directly.85 There are 
currently 38 member-states that are a party to the European Patent 
Convention (“EPC”).86  
The first step to achieving a patent is making sure the invention is 
patentable subject matter.87 The EPC created the EPO and also created the 
substantive law as to what is patentable in the EU.88 Where the inventor 
meets the criteria subject to the EPC, the EPO may issue a “European 
Patent” that provides patent rights in the 38 member-states.89  
Some of the Rules that the EPC stated are relevant to the patentability 
of stem cell research. Article 53(a) of the EPC prohibits patenting 
inventions where the commercial exploitation of the subject matter would 
be contrary to public order or morality.90 Rule 28 of the EPC prohibits 
patenting the process for cloning humans and processes for modifying the 
germ line genetic identify of humans.91 Rule 29 of the EPC prohibits the 
patentability of the human body, internal human material at the various 
stages of development of the human body, the simple discovery of an 
element of the human body, gene sequences, and partial gene sequences.92  
The TRIPS Agreement also disallows patentability for inventions that 
may infringe upon public order or morality grounds.93 The TRIPS 
Agreement defines public order and morality in a way that a party to the 
TRIPS Agreement may rely on this provision to protect human life and/or 
other concerns.94  
Patent law in the EU is complex in that the EPC works alongside the 
 
 83. BARNARD & PEERS, supra note 59, at 643. 
 84. PILA, supra note 16, at 113. 
 85. PLOMER, supra note 17, at 6. 
 86. These member-states include the 28 EU member-states as well as Albania, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Monaco, Norway, San Marino, Serbia, Switzerland, and Turkey. PLOMER, 
supra note 17, at 6. 
 87. Hoxha, supra note 10, at 590. 
 88. PLOMER, supra note 17, at 6. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Convention on the Grant of European Patents [hereinafter “EPC”] of 5 October 1973 as revised 
by the Act revising Article 63 EPC of 17 December 1991 and the Act revising the EPC of 29 November 
2000, Art. 53(a). 
 91. EPC, Rule 28. 
 92. EPC, Rule 29. 
 93. HUBEL, supra note 9, at 25. TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 94. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 21. TRIPS Agreement. 
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patent regimes in each member-state.95 Even in cases where stem cell 
research cannot be patented, EU law generally allows the marketing and 
commercialization of such products and processes developed from 
research.96 
Article 168 (ex 152, 129) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (hereinafter “TFEU”) provides EU governing bodies 
with the ability to regulate the derivatives of human blood and organs but 
also allows member-states to impose more stringent protections.97 The 
 
 95. EITLE, supra note 62, at 13. 
 96. PLOMER, supra note 17, at 180. 
 97. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 168, 
Oct. 26, 2012 O.J. (C326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. Article 168 (ex 152, 129) of the TFEU reads:  
 
1. A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and 
implementation of all Union policies and activities. Union action, which shall complement 
national policies, shall be directed towards improving public health, preventing physical 
and mental illness and diseases, and obviating sources of danger to physical and mental 
health. Such action shall cover the fight against the major health scourges, by promoting 
research into their causes, their transmission and their prevention, as well as health 
information and education, and monitoring, early warning of and combating serious cross-
border threats to health. The Union shall complement the Member States' action in reducing 
drugs-related health damage, including information and prevention. 2. The Union shall 
encourage cooperation between the Member States in the areas referred to in this Article 
and, if necessary, lend support to their action. It shall in particular encourage cooperation 
between the Member States to improve the complementarity of their health services in 
cross-border areas. Member States shall, in liaison with the Commission, coordinate among 
themselves their policies and programmes in the areas referred to in paragraph 1. The 
Commission may, in close contact with the Member States, take any useful initiative to 
promote such coordination, in particular initiatives aiming at the establishment of 
guidelines and indicators, the organisation of exchange of best practice, and the preparation 
of the necessary elements for periodic monitoring and evaluation. The European 
Parliament shall be kept fully informed. 3. The Union and the Member States shall foster 
cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the sphere 
of public health. 4. By way of derogation from Article 2(5) and Article 6(a) and in 
accordance with Article 4(2)(k) the European Parliament and the Council, acting in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall contribute to the achievement 
of the objectives referred to in this Article through adopting in order to meet common safety 
concerns: (a) measures setting high standards of quality and safety of organs and substances 
of human origin, blood and blood derivatives; these measures shall not prevent any 
Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures; (b) 
measures in the veterinary and phytosanitary fields which have as their direct objective the 
protection of public health; (c) measures setting high standards of quality and safety for 
medicinal products and devices for medical use. 5. The European Parliament and the 
Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting 
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, may also adopt 
incentive measures designed to protect and improve human health and in particular to 
combat the major cross-border health scourges, measures concerning monitoring, early 
warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health, and measures which have 
as their direct objective the protection of public health regarding tobacco and the abuse of 
alcohol, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. 6. 
The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may also adopt recommendations for 
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Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions of 6 July 
1998 (the “Biotech Directive” or “Directive 98/44/EC”), despite its 
controversial evolution, was necessary because it provided a pathway for 
the EU member-states could compete with the U.S. and other countries.98 
Using their powers, some individual member-states took action to 
develop the stem cell research industry. For example, the United 
Kingdom’s Stem Cell Initiative was designed to foster investment by 
large pharmaceutical firms.99  
The Biotech Directive was one of the most controversial and 
politicized pieces of EU legislation ever, taking ten years to complete.100 
The Biotech Directive should be viewed as a political compromise among 
many points of view on the subject.101 The compromise was necessary 
due to the cultural, religious, economic, and historical diversity across the 
EU.102 For example, German constitutional law provides a right to science 
and research but stem cell research in Germany also competes with other 
constitutional rights such as the rights to personality, life, and personal 
integrity.103 In effect, the Biotech Directive reproduces provisions of the 
EPC, codifies the EPC case law, and clarifies ambiguities within the 
EPC.104 The Biotech Directive remains the only substantive patent 
legislation on the subject matter at the EU level.105 Although it is not an 
organization of the EU, the EPO uses the Biotech Directive in matters of 
patentability which in theory should allow for greater harmonization of 
law across Europe.106 However, the EPO does not take direction from the 
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) which could threaten harmonization if 
the EPO at any time decided that its jurisprudence should separate.107 
Regardless, the ECJ is the de facto authority on both individual EU 
member-state patents and European patents if the litigation in question 
 
the purposes set out in this Article. 7. Union action shall respect the responsibilities of the 
Member States for the definition of their health policy and for the organisation and delivery 
of health services and medical care. The responsibilities of the Member States shall include 
the management of health services and medical care and the allocation of the resources 
assigned to them. The measures referred to in paragraph 4(a) shall not affect national 
provisions on the donation or medical use of organs and blood. 
 98. PLOMER, supra note 17, at 8. 
 99. DEVANEY, supra note 1, at 9. 
 100. PLOMER, supra note 17, at 3-4. 
 101. Id. at 26. 
 102. PLOMER, supra note 17, at 29. 
 103. Barbara Advena-Regnery, Hans-Georg Dederer, Franziska Enghofer, Tobias Cantz, & 
Thomas Heinemann, Framing the Ethical and Legal Issues of Human Artificial Gametes in Research, 
Therapy, and Assisted Reproduction: A German Perspective, 32 BIOETHICS 317 (2018). 
 104. PILA, supra note 16, at 129. 
 105. Id. 
 106. HUBEL, supra note 9, at 35. 
 107. Id. 
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begins in an EU member-state.108  
Despite efforts at creating a fully harmonized body of patent law in the 
EU, a unitary body of patent law does not yet exist. Consequently, higher 
costs exist for inventors attempting to secure and enforce patent rights on 
the European continent.109 However, over the years, the ECJ has drawn 
the European continent closer to a unified body of patent law through its 
harmonizing decisions.110 
A natural tension still exists in European patent law between the right 
to prohibit others from copying the technology and a purchaser’s right to 
resell the patented product purchased by that consumer.111 This tension is 
somewhat resolved by EU law which allows a purchaser to sell the 
purchased personal property as the owner sees fit.112 Therefore, the patent 
granted in Europe only extends to the prohibition of bringing the 
technology to the marketplace without permission.113 This exhaustion of 
rights doctrine does not allow a patent holder to block the entry of a 
patented good into another member-state once it has been freely and 
legally available in another member-state.114 The regulation of the sale of 
non-patented human tissue research is covered by Directive 
2004/23/EC.115 
EU law, generally, does regulate blood, organs, and human tissue 
through both regulations and patent law.116 The protection of human 
dignity and integrity is considered to be a guiding principle of the 
Directive 98/44/EC.117 However, human dignity is rarely mentioned in 
member-state constitutions despite the use of the phrase in many 
international documents.118 The definition of a human embryo becomes 
crucial in European patent law so that patentability can be established.119  
 
 108. Id. 
 109. PILA, supra note 16, at 113. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 210. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Directive 2004/23/EC of March 31, 2004, on Setting Standards of Quality and Safety for the 
Donation, Procurement, Testing, Processing, Preservation, Storage, and Distribution of Human Tissues 
and Cells. 
 116. BARNARD & PEERS, supra note 59, at 642. 
 117. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 23. 
 118. PLOMER, supra note 17, at 217. 
 119. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 29-30. 
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II. THE SCIENCE OF STEM CELLS. 
A. Application. 
Scientists first discovered stem cells in the 1950s in the marrow of long 
bones.120 Scientists then discovered the high levels of plasticity of 
embryonic stem cells in the 1980s largely by studying mice.121 By the 
1990s, scientists proposed that stem cells could regenerate organs such as 
the heart, liver, and nervous system.122 Human stem cells were first 
collected in 1998 by two research teams working independently—one 
team discovered the presence of stem cells from five-day-old blastocysts 
(a mammalian embryo in its early stages of development) and the second 
team discovered the presence of stem cells in two- to four-month old 
fetuses garnered from elective abortions.123 
The goal of most stem cell therapies is to produce new cells to replace 
cells that have died, as well as delivering new cells to parts of the body 
that need but lack them.124 Stem cell therapies require the cells to be 
injected into a patient akin to an organ transplant.125 Examples of stem 
cell therapy include injecting new muscle cells into a failing heart or 
neurons into a brain affected by a stroke.126  
Because stem cells are unspecialized, they hold the potential to grow 
bone tissue, cartilage, nerves, organs, and even breast tissue.127 
Embryonic stem cells, because of their plasticity, have a greater ability to 
differentiate compared to adult stem cells.128 Cells from embryos can 
create all of a human’s structures, including specialized cells, tissues, and 
organs.129 On the other hand, stem cells that replace lost cells in specific 
organs have limited plasticity, having only the ability to produce cells of 
specific tissue.130 However, these tissue-specific cells which can only be 
harvested post-natal could still be used to renew or repair existing 
tissue.131 For example, stem cells collected from umbilical cords are 
uniquely capable of treating a multitude of blood diseases such as 
 
 120. LYGIA V. PEREIRA, STEM CELLS: PROMISE AND REALITY 15 (2017). 
 121. JOSEPH PANNO, STEM CELL RESEARCH: MEDICAL APPLICATIONS & ETHICAL CONTROVERSY 
5 (2006). 
 122. PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 17. 
 123. PANNO, supra note 125, at 18-19. 
 124. JONATHAN SLACK, STEM CELLS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 10 (2012). 
 125. PANNO, supra note 125, at 59. 
 126. SLACK, supra note 128, at 10-11. 
 127. JOSEPH CHRISTIANO, STEM CELL REVOLUTION 14 (2018). 
 128. PANNO, supra note 125, at 1. 
 129. PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 2-3. 
 130. Id. at 11. 
 131. SLACK, supra note 128, at 70. 
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leukemia, lymphoma, anemia, and human immune diseases.132  
B. Garnering stem cells. 
A stem cell is a cell that can reproduce itself and also general offspring 
of different functional cell types.133 There are five types of stem cells: 
embryonic stem cells (garnered from an early developmental stage or 
embyro), fetal (garnered from a fetus), amniotic (garnered from amniotic 
fluid garnered from a routine amniocentesis procedure), post-natal 
(garnered from an umbilical cord or tissue from a healthy, live birth), and 
adult stem cells (garnered from a living human).134  
Despite these five categories, stem cells are usually divided into two 
groups: embryonic stem cells and adult stem cells.135 Embryonic stem 
cells originate from cells associated with the early embryo.136 They are 
generally derived from a pre-implantation embryo.137 Embryonic stem 
cells of a mammal are obtained exclusively from the inner cell mass of a 
blastocyst and when placed in a culture, can transform into many types of 
cells.138 The stem cells with the most therapeutic potential are the cells 
derived from a fertilized egg which can transform into an entire organism 
because they are totipotent—meaning they have almost unlimited 
potential for development.139  
The therapeutic advantage of embryonic stem cells is that they can 
become any type of cell, meaning they are pluripotent, while adult stem 
cells can give rise to just a limited number of types of cells.140 Adult stem 
cells are harvested post-birth from umbilical cords and/or placentas.141 
The types of proteins embedded in the membrane of an embryonic stem 
are different than those of an adult stem cell.142 
The therapeutic advantage of embryonic stem cells is that they can 
become any type of cell, meaning they are pluripotent, while adult stem 
cells can give rise to just a limited number of types of cells.143  
 
 132. PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 26. 
 133. Id. at 2. 
 134. NEIL H. RIORDAN, STEM CELL THERAPY: A RISING TIDE 37 (2017). 
 135. PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 12-13. 
 136. SLACK, supra note 128, at 5. 
 137. CHRISTIANO, supra note 131, at 9. 
 138. PANNO, supra note 125, at 5. 
 139. Id. at 5. 
 140. PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 43. MARK BERMAN & ELLIOT LANDER, THE STEM CELL 
REVOLUTION 1 (2015). 
 141. Id. at 13. 
 142. PANNO, supra note 125, at 1. 
 143. PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 43. MARK BERMAN & ELLIOT LANDER, THE STEM CELL 
REVOLUTION 1 (2015). 
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Cell differentiation is the process by which the genes of a cell and the 
external environment interact to produce specialized cells such as liver 
cells, heart cells, and bone cells.144 Cell differentiation can occur in one 
of three ways: spontaneously, through a process called directed 
differentiation which allows cells to contact each other, or when the 
culture medium is provided with certain growth factors.145 Stimulating the 
cell cultures using growth factors will focus the differentiation toward a 
particular type of cell.146 The first stage of differentiation divides the 
embryo into four groups of cells, all of which become progressively 
differentiated and specialized into various tissues and organs.147 Scientists 
consider embryonic stem cells to be “undifferentiated” because they can 
divide without limit and, most likely, become all of the various cell types 
found in the human body.”148 Stem cells can also divide and regenerate 
for an indefinite period of time after they are harvested.149 Similar to 
embryotic cells, stem cells can also differentiate into more than one type 
of cell.150 Cell differentiation, when taking place in the embryo, allows 
cells to take on specific forms and functions.151 In a laboratory, embryonic 
stem cells can respond to various forms of stimuli.152  
Embryonic stem cells can be extracted from embryos beginning in the 
third day of development when an embryo is made up of 100 cells. These 
100 cells can be divided into placenta cells or those developing into all 
adult tissues.153 During extraction, the inner cell mass is removed from 
the blastocyst and multiplied in a way that embryonic stem cells are 
produced in large quantities and perhaps can serve as an unlimited source 
for transplants.154 If the association between the inner cell mass and the 
trophoblast is disrupted, the embryonic stem cell cannot develop into an 
embryo.155  
Currently, there is no way to remove an embryonic stem cell from the 
inner core mass of a blastocyst without killing the embryo.156 Once human 
embryonic stem cells are collected, they are grown in a culture and 
stimulated in several ways to determine the kinds of cells into which they 
 
 144. CHRISTIANO, supra note 131, at 10. 
 145. PANNO, supra note 125, at 3. 
 146. Id. at 26. 
 147. PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 3. 
 148. SLACK, supra note 128, at 5. 
 149. CHRISTIANO, supra note 131, at 8. 
 150. PANNO, supra note 125, at 1. 
 151. PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 2. 
 152. Id. at 46. 
 153. PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 43. 
 154. Id. at 43. 
 155. PANNO, supra note 125, at 5. 
 156. Id. at 23. 
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may differentiate.157 Stem cells can also be harvested from umbilical 
cords after birth and stored later for therapeutic treatment.158 These “cord 
cells” can also produce blood cells and are commonly used to treat cancer 
patients.159 
C. Limitations. 
There are academics that argue that the promise of stem cell research 
therapy has been overstated and that there exist significant obstacles and 
limitations associated with stem cell research.160 First, they argue, 
regardless of the method of stem cell therapy, donor compatibility is still 
an issue; because the issue of compatibility exists, the industry associated 
with the banking of umbilical cords after a person’s birth is growing.161 A 
recent example of the problems associated with donor compatibility is the 
success researchers have found treating beta-thalassemia, an inherited 
blood disorder, that affects only 228,000 people worldwide. Despite the 
success from to a new treatment, that success is dependent upon finding 
a donor match as to avoid other health risks.162  
Second, academics argue that most of what we know about stem cells 
comes from studying mice and rats.163 Clinical trials involving stem cells 
and humans did not occur until 2010 largely due to safety concerns 
associated with injecting stem cells into the human body.164 Research 
suggests that stem cells from other mammals can’t be used to cure 
diseases in humans.165 Consequently, critics argue that it is too early to 
say that stem cell therapies are safe for human use.166  
Third, critics argue that biomedical research is quite expensive. A 
research team focusing on the standard practice of testing on animals 
followed by four stages of human application can range between 
$500,000 and $3 billion.167 Due to the cost associated with biomedical 
research, most activity in this area is conducted by pharmaceutical 
firms.168  
 
 157. Id. at 24. 
 158. CHRISTIANO, supra note 131, at 9. 
 159. Id. 
 160. PANNO, supra note 125, at 61. 
 161. PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 27. 
 162. Sarah Troy, Gene Therapy Shows Promise in Patients with a Blood Disorder, WALL ST. J. 
(April 19, 2018: 4:21AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gene-therapy-shows-promise-in-patients-with-
a-blood-disorder-1524085227?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=3.  
 163. PANNO, supra note 125, at 18. 
 164. PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 58-59. 
 165. PANNO, supra note 125, at 18. 
 166. SLACK, supra note 128, at 39. 
 167. Id. at 51. 
 168. Id. 
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Fourth, and more directly related to science, critics argue that 
embryonic stem cells do not compare well to adult tissue as the former 
are programmed to become fetuses and therefore can grow too rapidly in 
a context other than pregnancy when the two types of cells are forced to 
interact.169  
Lastly, critics fear on grounds that the science behind it is unsafe, that 
stem cell research will lead to the cloning of humans despite the fact that 
human cloning has never occurred and virtually all scientists oppose it for 
safety reasons.170 
III. HIGHLIGHTS OF STATUTORY LAW REGULATING THE STEM CELL 
INDUSTRY IN EUROPE. 
A. The European Patent Convention. 
Article 52(1) of the EPC states that inventions can be protected by a 
patent in all fields of technology so long as the invention is new, involves 
an inventive step, and is susceptible of industrial application.171 However, 
Article 52(2) enumerates what is not an invention and thus not patentable 
and includes scientific theories, mathematical methods, aesthetic 
creations, business methods, rules for playing games, computer programs, 
and presentations of information.172 Article 53 specifies exceptions to 
patentability, separate from what is not considered an invention pursuant 
to Article 52(2), and includes inventions for which the commercial 
exploitation would be contrary to a member-state’s public order or 
morality, plant varieties, animal varieties, biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals, and methods for the treatment of the 
human or animal body by surgery, therapy, or diagnostic methods 
practiced on the human or animal body.173 
Rule 28 (ex 23d) of the EPC further expands upon the exceptions to 
patentability found in Article 53.174 Specifically, Rule 28 prohibits 
processes for cloning human beings, processes for modifying the germ 
line genetic identity of human beings, uses of human embryos for 
industrial or commercial purposes, and processes for modifying the 
genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering 
without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also 
 
 169. BERMAN & LANDER, supra note 135, at 1. 
 170. SLACK, supra note 128, at 37. 
 171. EPC, Article 52. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. EPC, Rule 28. 
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animals resulting from such processes.175 Rule 29 (ex 23e) of the EPC 
prohibits the human body from patentability including any stage of human 
development, the simple discovery of one of the human body’s elements, 
and the sequence or partial sequence of a gene from patentability.176 
However, Rule 29 does allow for the patentability of an element isolated 
from the human body or produced by a technical process which could 
include the sequencing of a gene or partial sequencing of a gene even if 
what is produced (i.e., the element) is identical to the natural element.177 
However, any attempt to patent a process including the sequencing or 
partial sequencing of a gene must be fully disclosed in the patent 
application.178 
B. The TRIPs Agreement. 
Article 27 of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement (“TRIPs Agreement”) has nearly identical language to Article 
52 of the EPC. This language provides that an invention is patentable if it 
is (1) new, (2) involves an inventive step, and (3) is capable of industrial 
application. 179 Article 27 also states that member-states may prohibit 
inventions for which a member-state believes it needs to prohibit 
patentability to protect public order and morality, to protect human, 
animal, or plant life or health, and/to protect the environment.180 
Additionally, Article 27 allows member-states to prohibit the patenting of 
inventions for (1) diagnosis, therapy, and surgical methods for humans or 
animals; and (2) biological processes for the production of plants or 
animals. 181 However, the TRIPs Agreement, unlike the EPC, is not 
mandatory.  
C. Directive 98/44/EC. 
Directive 98/44/EC is the chief statutory source of law promulgated by 
the EU governing stem cell research despite its broader scope to define 
the legal protection for all biological inventions.182 In the fairly lengthy 
preamble to Directive 98/44/EC, that the European Parliament and the 
European Council recognized that there existed deep divisions and many 
 
 175. EPC, Rule 28. 
 176. EPC, Rule 29. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. TRIPs Agreement, Art. 27. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions 1998 O.J. (L 213).  
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approaches as to how the various member-states protected biological 
inventions.183 If these diverging approaches were to continue, the EU’s 
common market could be threatened.184 The preamble also, however, 
specifically acknowledges the need to safeguard and respect the dignity 
and integrity of persons and the human body at virtually all stages of 
development.185  
Article 3 of Directive 98/44/EC defines the general framework for the 
patentability of a biological invention including that the invention is new, 
involves an inventive step which is susceptible to industrial application. 
Specific to biological inventions, Article 3 states that biological material 
that is isolated from its natural environment by way of a technical process 
can also be patented even if that same biological material previously 
occurred in nature.186 Article 1 immediately strikes a balance between 
national and international law stating that, although inventions are to be 
protected pursuant to a member-state’s national law, member-states must 
adhere to the principles of EU law and other international agreements 
such as the TRIPs Agreement and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity.187 Article 2 broadly defines biological material as any genetic 
material capable of reproducing itself or being reproduced in a biological 
system.188 Article 6 serves as a significant limitation on the patentability 
of biological inventions, in the form of an exception even if the 
requirements of Article 3 are met by an inventor, in that biological 
inventions that through commercial exploitation would be contrary to 
public order and morality cannot be patented with exact prohibitions 
identified by category including the cloning of human beings, a process 
for modifying the genetic identity of a human being, the use of human 
embryos for industrial or commercial purposes, and the a process for 
modifying the genetic identify of animals.189  
Articles 15 and 16 are administrative in context yet are quite important. 
Article 15 orders member-states to align their law with the requirements 
of Directive 98/44/EC by July 30, 2000 and by doing so must provide in 
law a reference to this Directive but allows each member-state to 
unilaterally determine how this reference shall be found within its law.190 
Article 16 requires the EU to develop a report that identifies any issues 
associated with the harmonization of law governed by Directive 98/44/EC 
 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
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and conflicts with international agreements germane to Directive 
98/44/EC.191 
D. Directive 2004/23/EC. 
The focus of Directive 2004/23/EC aims to promote the biological 
innovation industry by ensuring the safety of the industry and the quality 
of the industry’s products.192 The range of regulation for this Directive 
includes the procurement, testing, processing, storage, and distribution of 
human tissues and cells across the EU.193 Under Directive 2004/23/EC, 
regulation extends specifically to blood, umbilical cord and bone marrow 
stem cells, reproductive cells including eggs and sperm, fetal tissues, adult 
stem cells, and embryonic stem cells.194 Although stem cells are not 
specifically identified, the term “cells” is defined in Article 3 as 
“individual human cells or a collection of human cells when not bound by 
any form of connective tissue.” Article 5 articulates that professionals 
working within this industry and their employers must be well certified, 
have training and expertise, and must be employed by an entity operating 
with approval from a member-state’s proper authority.195 Article 7 
requires that member-states put into place an inspection regime whereby 
inspections are performed when serious incidents occur.196 Relatedly, 
Article 8 requires the member-state’s regulatory regime to develop a 
process whereby donated human tissue and cells can be traced to the 
donor while Article 14 requires that all information including information 
concerning the donor’s genetics remains confidential.197 
E. Directive 2015/566/EU. 
Much like Directive 2004/23/EC (discussed supra ), Directive 
2016/566 sets standards for industry safety regarding the donation, 
procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage, and distribution 
of human tissues and cells.198 This Directive places significant emphasis 
on consumer protection and the inspection of imported human tissues and 
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 192. Directive 2004/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on 
setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation, 
storage and distribution of human tissues and cells 2004 O.J. (L 103). 
 193. Id.  
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 198. Commission Directive (EU) 2015/566 of 8 April 2015 implementing Directive 2004/23/EC 
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cells.199 This ensures that professionals and certified professional 
establishments are the routine providers of these services.200 Those 
involved in these activities should be authorized and licensed by a 
member-state’s regulatory regime.201 Article 1 makes clear that the 
Directive applies to any human tissues and cells that will be the subject 
of human application yet were imported into the EU but are not subject to 
Directive 2004/23/EC.202 Article 3 states that any entity having the desire 
to import human cells and tissues must do so by using the services of 
establishments that are accredited, designated, authorized, or licensed by 
the proper legal authority of the member-state and any importation must 
have prior approval from a member-state’s legal authority.203 
IV. THE PURPOSE OF THIS WORK. 
There are five aspirations for this work. First, this work seeks to inform 
the practitioner of the scope, limitations, and environment of stem cell 
and biotechnological research and patentability in the EU which will 
include the basic law of patentability but also a dive into related issues of 
law in this area. Second, this work should make the practitioner aware of 
the issues of morality that affect the legal environment encompassing 
stem cell and biotechnological research and patentability in European 
countries. Third, this work will describe the interplay between the ECJ 
and the European Patent Office including the latter’s judicial bodies. 
Fourth, a set of threats to the harmonization of law on the subject of stem 
cell and biotechnological research will be identified. Lastly, a body of 
recommendations will be identified that could assist EU and EPC 
member-states in their attempts to harmonize law across the European 
continent. 
V. CASE LAW FROM THE ECJ REGARDING STEM CELL RESEARCH AND 
RELATED RESEARCH. 
A. Patentability. 
The ECJ’s decision in The Netherlands v. Parliament is critical to 
understanding the scope and limitations of patentability. In that case, three 
member-state governments challenged Directive 98/44/EC almost as 
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soon as the Directive became law. 204 The challenging countries first 
complained that the Directive was not within the scope of authority 
granted to the EU governmental bodies designed to protect the 
functioning of the internal market.205 The ECJ disagreed stating that the 
Directive clearly was designed to make sure that all member-states were 
acting uniformly on issues associated with biotechnological inventions 
that would otherwise interfere with trade across the member-states.206  
Additionally, the ECJ remarked that Directive 98/44/EC was crafted to 
address divergent points of view across the member-states on the 
patentability of inventions relating to the human body and plant varieties 
and that such divergent mentalities could damage trade, where, in regard 
to a particular subject matter, some member-states might grant patent 
protection and others may not.207 According to the ECJ, differences in 
patentability of the same subject matter could not only cause problems 
associated with trade across member-state borders, but could also create 
conflicts with various international trade agreements to which the EU’s 
member-states are a party.208 However, the ECJ was careful to point out 
that Directive 98/44/EC does not create an EU-wide patent and that any 
patent granted is a patent granted only by a member-state government.209 
The ECJ also noted that the Directive was needed to establish 
harmonization regarding biotechnological inventions because such 
uniformity could not be established by the member-states acting on their 
own.210 
Most interestingly the challenging member-states expressed concerns 
that Directive 98/44/EC did not harmonize the law on patentability. 
Instead, they argued, the directive created the possibility of divergent laws 
among the member-states due to the ability of member-states to prohibit 
the patenting of inventions that violate public order and morality.211 The 
ECJ admitted that although allowing member-states to prohibit the 
patenting of inventions that violate morality and public order gave 
member-state governments and their courts “a wide scope,” this result 
was desirable because each member-state is best-suited to determine what 
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its culture and social context will tolerate.212 Many international 
agreements give parties to those agreements similar latitude in 
determining patentable subject matter. 213 Further, the ECJ made clear that 
Directive 98/44/EC provides guidelines to member-states as to how to 
apply a sense of public order and morality; mere commercial exploitation 
of the subject matter is not contrary to public order and morality simply 
because it is contrary to national law. 214 More subtly, the ECJ provided 
that the slight difference in language between the Directive and the EPC 
did not put the Directive in jeopardy. .215  
More specific to human biotechnology, the ECJ stated that the absence 
of a requirement in Directive 98/44/EC that a human donor of biological 
material provide consent did not violate the EU right of self-determination 
that would nullify the Directive.216 The ECJ contended that it is the ECJ’s 
responsibility to safeguard the fundamental right to human dignity and 
integrity.217 The Directive itself provides language prohibiting the 
patentability of the human body at various stages of formation and 
development.218 Directive 98/44/EC’s prohibitions on human 
patentability are sufficient to protect against violations of human dignity 
and integrity along with the more specific prohibitions against 
patentability including processes for cloning of human beings, uses of 
human embryos, and the processes for modifying germ line genetic 
identity.219 Importantly, to any researcher in this field, the ECJ also 
pointed out that Directive 98/44/EC does not address whether certain 
forms of research are permitted, to which member-states may address on 
their own, and only addresses the patentability of subject matter.220 
In Brustle v. Greenpeace, the ECJ faced several technical questions 
regarding stem cell science including the definitions of “human embryo,” 
“industrial or commercial use,” and “technical teaching.”221 In Brustle, 
Greenpeace urged the German courts to nullify a patent for, among other 
things, the isolation and purification of neural precursor cells, and the 
 
 212. Id. at ¶¶ 37-38. 
 213. Id. at ¶ 38. 
 214. Id. at ¶ 39. 
 215. Id. at ¶ 61. The prohibitive phrase used in Directive 98/44/EC is “whose commercial 
exploitation would be contrary to order public or morality.” The prohibitive phrase used in the European 
Patent Convention is “inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to order 
public or morality.” Id. The ECJ stated that a breach of public order or morality could equally be 
established by the subject matter of the invention either by publication, exploitation, or commercialization. 
Id. at ¶ 62. 
 216. Id. at ¶ 69. 
 217. Id. at ¶¶ 70-71  
 218. Id.  
 219. Id. at ¶¶ 72, 74, 76. 
 220. Id. at ¶¶ 79, 80. 
 221. Case C-34/10,Brustle v. Greenpeace e.V., 2011 E.C.R. I-9821, at ¶ 23.  
26
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss4/3
2019] STEM CELL PATENTABILITY IN THE EU 1003 
process for the production of embryonic stem cells, and the use of neural 
precursor cells for the treatment of neural defects. 222 Mr. Brustle 
contended in his patent application that transplantation of such cells could 
treat neurological diseases and that some attempts had been made prior to 
treat patients with Parkinson’s disease.223 Controversially, Mr. Brustle’s 
process required the transplant of immature precursor cells from the 
cerebral tissue of human embryos still in their development phase.224 In 
his patent application, Mr. Brustle was hopeful for the possibility of 
embryonic stem cell transplants because such technology could lead to an 
unlimited amount of isolated and purified cells with both neural and glial 
(suited for brain and spinal cord areas) properties.225 Greenpeace’s chief 
concern was that the precursor cells were obtained from human 
embryonic stem cells.226 
The Convention on the Grant of European Patents (“CGEP”), which 
binds the individual member-states of the EU but not the EU itself, allows 
for the patenting of biological inventions generally so long as the patented 
product or process meets the traditional conditions of newness, inventive 
step, and the potential for industrial application.227 Directive 98/44/EC 
goes even further and allows patent protection for biological material, 
processes developed through the use of biological material, and biological 
material that is produced, processed, or used.228 The third prohibition, that 
patents cannot be awarded for products and processes that violate public 
order and morality and as identified by an individual member-state is 
much more general and certainly more open to interpretation.229 Even 
within Directive 98/44/EC’s prohibitions on morally questionable 
patents,  a member-state can grant a patent the use of human embryos for 
therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which are applied and useful to a 
human embryo.230 Further, an element of the human body (e.g., organs, 
cells) that is isolated due to the identification, purification, and 
classification for reproduction outside the body can be patented by a 
member-state.231  
German law on the patentability of biological inventions mirrors 
Directive 98/44/EC but goes further in creating criminal offenses 
whereby ova is fertilized for any other purpose than to impregnate a 
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woman from which the ova originated, when a human embryo is sold after 
conception either by in vitro or removed from a woman before the 
nidation process has been completed in the uterus, when ova is transferred 
or acquired for the use other than preservation, and when in vitro 
fertilization occurs for the development of human embryos for any other 
purpose than inducing pregnancy.232 German law also provides two 
crucial definitions including the definition of an embryo which is defined 
as a fertilized human ovum capable of develop and/or any cell removed 
from a cell that is totipotent.233 In contrast, a stem cell is defined as a cell 
capable of developing into any kind of cell yet cannot be developed into 
a complete human being.234 but pursuant to German law can be the subject 
of scientific research if several conditions are met by the researcher.235 
For a stem cell to be used in scientific research, German law requires that 
the stem cells (1) were obtained in compliance with the member-state’s 
law, (2) were originally produced with the goal of in vitro fertilization but 
became superfluous, (3) were not exchanged for remuneration, (4) were 
not imported in violation of any other law, (5) were not obtained in a way 
that offends the German legal order, and (6) are to be used pursuant to 
“high-level” research aims.236 
According to the ECJ, the EU intended to prohibit the patentability of 
something whereby human dignity would be infringed upon and to make 
sure that “human embryo” was well defined across the member-states.237 
The ECJ stated that the definition of a human embryo, which should be 
shared across the member-states, is any human ovum as soon as it is 
fertilized if the fertilization is such as to commence the process of 
developing a human being.238 Additionally, the ECJ contended that the 
definition of human embryo must include non-fertilized ovum that has 
received, by transplant into its cell nucleus, a mature human cell and non-
fertilized human ovum whose division and development have been 
stimulated by parthenogenesis.239 Despite these definitions, the ECJ 
stated that stem cells obtained from human embryos at the blastocyst stage 
are not necessarily included within the human embryo definition.240 The 
ECJ allowed that member-states’ courts are free to determine whether 
these stem cells should be included within the definition of human embryo 
and excluded from patentability. Despite these clear-cut definitions, the 
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ECJ stated that stem cells obtained from human embryos at the blastocyst 
stage are not necessarily included within the human embryo definition 
and that national courts are free to determine, based on their interpretation 
of scientific knowledge as to whether these stem cells can become human 
beings, should be included within the definition of human embryo for the 
purposes of the exclusion on patentability.241 
The ECJ also stated that the prohibition on the use of human embryos 
for industrial and commercial purposes also included a prohibition on the 
use of human embryos for scientific research.242 Therefore, the ECJ held 
that what is produced through human embryos for industrial and 
commercial purposes, and scientific research, is not patentable. 243 The 
ECJ did recognized that the aims of industrial/ commercial research are 
different and Directive 98/44/EC did not separate patent eligibility based 
on those aims.244 Lastly, and most harmfully to Mr. Brustle, the ECJ held 
that patentability was prohibited under Directive 98/44/EC—even for 
technical teaching claims.245 Mr. Brustle’s patent required stem cells 
obtained from embryos at the blastocyst stage.246 This required the 
destruction of human embryos.247 The ECJ contended that the embryos’ 
stage of development was irrelevant when the end result destroyed human 
embryos at any stage.248 
Although the ECJ left the final determination to member-states’ courts, 
the ECJ urged uniformity in this area of law.249 First, the ECJ felt it was 
important to provide a uniform definition of human embryo since 
Directive 98/44/EC failed to do so.250 Second, the ECJ remarked that the 
harmonization of law governing the patentability of biological inventions 
across the member-states would improve the free flow of trade and 
strengthen the EU’s common market while also increasing the amount of 
research in the area of genetic engineering.251 Third (and most importantly 
to firms trying to nullify patents on biological inventions), the ECJ stated 
that different definitions of “human embryo” could incentivize firms to 
patent their inventions in more flexible jurisdictions. 252 Despite the 
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aforementioned statements on the need for unity of law, the ECJ found 
that Directive 98/44/EC did allow for wide discretion in regard to the 
exclusions to patentability based on a member-state’s need for public 
order and morale.253 
In ISCC, the ECJ held that the intent of its decision in Brustle was to 
state that a non-fertilized human ovum should be considered a human 
embryo within the scope of Directive 98/44/EC in that such an organism 
has the capability of beginning the process of development of a human 
being.254 In contrast, according to the ECJ, Directive 98/44/EC must be 
interpreted to mean that a non-fertilized human ovum incapable of 
development of a human being cannot be a human embryo.255 Tying these 
two points together, the ECJ proclaimed that any ovum possessing the 
capability of development into a human being, fertilized or not, must be 
defined for the purposes of Directive 98/44/EC as a human embryo.256 
In ISCC, the ECJ relied on several provisions of Directive 98/44/EC’s 
preamble to guide its reasoning. Collectively, the cited preamble 
provisions make clear that although the EU recognizes the importance of 
research and development in biotechnology, such research must be 
regulated to safeguard human dignity and integrity. 257 Specific to this 
concern for the protection of the fundamental principles and human 
dignity and integrity is research of germ cells and the sequencing of 
human genes either fully or partially.258 The EU is trying to strike a 
balance between specifically enumerating prohibited patents and 
allowing member-states to determine which inventions violate the states’ 
own sense of morality and public order.259 Regardless, the preamble 
makes int clear that processes developed for therapeutic and/or diagnostic 
purposes can be patented.260 
The ECJ further asserted that although the Directive allowed for 
biotechnical inventions, it did not allow the human body—or any part of 
the human body or its formation— to be patented.261 Additionally, any 
biotechnological invention that violates the public order or morality of a 
member-state may be prohibited from patentability.262 
In this case, ISCC filed two patent applications with the United 
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Kingdom Intellectual Property Office (“UKIPO”), one for the 
parthenogenetic activation of oocytes for the production of human 
embryonic stem cells, and another for a synthetic cornea made from 
retinal stem cells.263 The UKIPO denied both applications on grounds that 
this technology involved unfertilized human ova that could, when 
stimulated by parthenogenesis, develop into a human being.264 ISCC 
appealed to the ECJ, arguing that Brustle merely prohibited patenting 
human embryos capable of developing into a human being while ISCC 
contended that its biological material could not do this.265 
The ECJ had to determine whether unfertilized human ova, stimulated 
by parthenogenesis and incapable of becoming human beings, are the 
same as human embryos for purposes of patentability.266 The ECJ noted 
the limits on patenting biological subject matter, which did not extend to 
the scientific development of biotechnology as a whole. The ECJ 
furthered it’s holding from Brustle that a non-fertilized ovum is not a 
human embryo for purposes of patentability, as long as any development 
process involved is not sufficient to form a human being.267 However, the 
ECJ also stated that if parthenogenesis can lead a human ovum (a 
parthenote) to develop into a human being, that human ovum would have 
to be treated like fertilized ovum and thus considered a human embryo for 
the purposes of patentability under Directive 98/44/EC.268 On the subject 
of the balance between these two positions, specifically whether or not 
parthenogenesis can transform human ovum to a human being, the ECJ 
found the more relevant question to be whether the ISCC’s method of 
parthenogenesis had the capacity to develop unfertilized ova into human 
beings based on current scientific knowledge.269 The ECJ left this 
question open to its member-states.270 
In Commission v. Italy, the ECJ addressed the question of whether Italy 
had met its obligation to fully implement Directive 98/44/EC in regard to 
its domestic patent law.271 Italian law recognizes patent rights for 
industrial inventions that are new, involve inventive steps, and are 
susceptible to industrial application.272 Regarding specific prohibitions, 
Italian patent law provided that an invention is prohibited when it causes 
a permanent diminution of physical integrity or is in violation of law, 
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public policy, or if the invention allowed for a biological process to obtain 
an animal breed.273 Italy’s patent law had additional prohibitive language 
stating that inventions are not patentable subject matter if the exploitation 
of the subject matter would be contrary to public policy and morality, yet 
stated that a public policy or morality violation would be found merely 
because the invention is prohibited by domestic law.274 Italian law also 
provided the patentee with exclusive rights to the invention, whether a 
product or process, and thus to prohibit third parties from producing, 
using, marketing, or selling, or importing the product or process.275  
Italian law was in contradiction to Directive 98/44/EC and Italy 
conceded that it did not implement the Directive within the required time 
period. The EU complained that Italian patent law did not allow for 
biotechnological patents.276 The ECJ’s standard for determining 
compliance with a Directive is if the member-state’s law is sufficiently 
clear and precise to enable an individual to know of their rights and 
responsibilities.277 There is no specific manner by which a member-state 
must implement domestic legislation pursuant to a Directive.278 The 
Italian government argued that the term “industrial invention” within its 
domestic patent law was broad enough to include biotechnological 
inventions.279 The ECJ disagreed, arguing that the definitional distinction 
between Italian law and that of other member-states could create 
contradictions in patent law across the EU.280 The ECJ believed that 
Italian law must specifically mention the patentability of biological 
material.281 
The EU Commission complained that Italian law did not provide for 
the patentability of an element isolated form the human body or otherwise 
produced by a technical process.282 Italy responded that its definition of 
the word “invention” was sufficiently inclusive.283 The ECJ disagreed, 
holding that the elements of the human body are not patentable unless the 
invention combines natural elements with technical processes.284 The ECJ 
stated that Italian patent law was not specific enough to satisfy the 
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requirement of clarity as to what is and what is not patentable subject 
matter.285 
Lastly, this lack of harmony between Directive 98/44/EC and Italy’s 
patent law forced the EU Commission to contend that Italy had not met 
its obligation to fully synthesize the Directive with its domestic law.286 
According to the European Commission, Italy did not provide for the 
prohibition against the patentability of inventions leading to the cloning 
of human beings and the use of human embryos for industrial and 
commercial purposes.287 Italy suggested that provisions of Italian law, 
outside of its patent law, that dictate human cloning and modification of 
the genetic identity of humans as practices contrary to public policy and 
morality meet the requirements of Directive 98/44/EC.288 Moreover, Italy 
contended that it’s prohibition against activities involving the disposition 
of the human body is sufficient notice that the modification of the genetic 
identity of a human being could not be patentable pursuant to Italian 
law.289 After listing the various specific prohibitions to patentability 
pursuant to Directive 98/44/EC and reminding the reader that member-
states are given wide discretion in determining which inventions would 
be contrary to public order and morality, the ECJ still commanded that 
specific prohibitions are not subject to the level of wide discretion as those 
inventions that might generally violate public order or morality.290 
According to the ECJ, the specific prohibitions found in Directive 
98/44/EC are to be excluded “unequivocally” from patentability and that 
a member-state’s law must provide clarity on these specific 
prohibitions.291 
B. Taxation. 
EU member-states maintain much discretion over the marketplace for 
stem cells. In CopyGene v. Skatteministeriet, the ECJ held that national 
courts of the member-states can determine whether the activities of stem 
cell banks are exempt from the value-added tax (“VAT”).292 At issue in 
CopyGene was whether the Danish government could make the activities 
of a private sector stem cell bank, which engaged in various activities 
including the collection, transportation, analysis, and storage of blood 
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from umbilical cords for the purpose of securing stem cells from the 
umbilical cords for future medical treatment, subject to the EU-wide 
VAT.293 The Danish courts referred the case to the ECJ after a firm, 
CopyGene A/S, challenged the Danish government’s refusal to exempt its 
activities from the VAT on the basis that the potential for the medicinal 
use of stem cells and stem cell research is so distant into the future that 
the activities of firms like CopyGene could not qualify as current medical 
treatment, which by definition would exclude such activities from the 
VAT.294 
The Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC (“the Sixth Directive”) 
establishes the VAT framework in the EU and exempts activities within 
hospitals, medical care, and related activities.295 The Sixth Directive also 
states that the provider of these services must be conducted by an entity 
governed by public law, an entity acting under similar social conditions 
to that of an entity governed by public law, hospitals, medical centers, or 
other duly recognized establishments.296 Directive 2004/23/EC 
establishes safety standards for donation, procurement, testing, 
processing, preservation, storage, and distribution of human tissue and 
cells.297 Directive 2004/23/EC also states that member-states have the 
responsibility of accrediting, designating, authorizing, and licensing the 
providers of stem cell-related services.298 Danish law met Directive 
2004/23/EC’s mandates.299 However, when CopyGene applied for VAT 
exemption, the Danish government rejected the application.300 CopyGene 
appealed to the Danish courts, arguing that its activities qualified as 
“closely related” to the services of a hospital and/or would meet the 
definition of “medical care.”301 Complicating this case, the Danish 
government previously approved CopyGene to engage in stem cell-
related activities.302 CopyGene specifically would enter into a contract 
with clients (parents expecting children) for the collection, transportation, 
analysis, and storage of cord blood of the clients’ newborn children for 
the only purpose of medical treatment if the child suffered from a serious 
illness.303 CopyGene would not own the stem cells, they would be owned 
by the newborn child by representation of the newborn’s mother, nor have 
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the authority to engage in research endeavors.304 However, these services 
were not covered nor reimbursed by the Danish government’s public 
health care system.305 
The ECJ’s decision largely rested on the language of the Sixth 
Directive. The ECJ found the VAT’s scope to be broad, encompassing 
virtually all traded goods and services.306 Any exemptions found in the 
Sixth Directive are designed to ensure that member-states treat all 
commercial transactions alike.307 Accordingly, the ECJ held that the Sixth 
Directive covers virtually all medical services that can lead to diagnosis 
and cure of health problems.308 For example, the ECJ noted that the 
definition of medical care within the Sixth Directive has been interpreted 
to include medical care that is prophylactic in nature and care that is 
designed to reduce the cost of medical care, restore health, and/or protect 
health.309  
The ECJ held that the stem cell-related services provided by CopyGene 
were within the scope of the terms “closely related” to “hospital and 
medical” care within the meaning of the Sixth Directive.310 The ECJ 
contended that, because of the nature of stem cells and stem cell research, 
including the collection, storage, transportation, and analysis activities, 
even if the medical care has not yet been performed, commenced, and/or 
envisaged, the Sixth Directive allows for a VAT exemption.311 The ECJ 
further stated that “medical care” was not limited to current scientific 
knowledge.312 As such, VAT exemptions should rest on current medical 
practices as opposed to courts’ predictions for the future of medical 
care.313  
The ECJ next had to resolve the issue of whether the activities specific 
to the firm itself, CopyGene, were within the definition of an entity that 
could be described as acting similar in nature to hospitals and medical 
centers.314 In a somewhat confusing manner, the ECJ held that the 
language of the Sixth Directive, as it applied to an entity like CopyGene, 
does not require a member-state to exempt it from VAT nor does it require 
a member-state to not exempt it from VAT regardless of whether, 
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objectively, the activities are covered by the VAT exemption and that 
neither an entity like CopyGene nor its clients receive support from the 
public health care system.315 While agreeing with the Danish government, 
the ECJ stated that the mere authorization by a member-state to allow a 
private entity to engage in the various stem cell-related activities does not 
mean the entity is operating in similar fashion to a hospital or medical 
care facility for the purposes of the Sixth Directive’s exemption.316 
Although the ECJ returned the decision of whether a firm, such as 
CopyGene, and its activities should meet the requirements of the VAT 
exemption to the member-state, the ECJ did state that there are factors, 
although not decisive, that a member-state should consider such as: (1) 
whether the entity receives support from the public health service and (2) 
whether the entity is governed by public or private law.317 
In similar fashion, the ECJ in Future Health v. United Kingdom found 
several stem cell-related activities to be outside the exemption for 
VAT.318 Future Health followed the CopyGene case and the ECJ relied 
on the latter case to find that the mere storage of stem cells for possible, 
future therapeutic use was not within the confines of “hospital and 
medical care” for the purposes of the VAT exemption.319 A key difference 
between the two decisions is that Directive 2006/112 repealed and 
replaced the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC, thus revamping the 
VAT system across the EU in order to make the law on VAT clearer and 
more rational but without a substantial change of the scope of the VAT.320 
However, the ECJ stated that the terms of Directive 2006/112 and the 
Sixth Directive were identical and that the two laws should be interpreted 
in the same manner.321 
Specific to the facts in Future Health, the ECJ was asked to determine 
whether five activities were within the scope of the VAT tax exemption 
for “hospital and medical care” including: (1) providing parents of an 
unborn child with a kit used to collect blood from an umbilical cord at the 
time of the newborn’s birth, which would be used by a trained 
professional at the time of birth; (2) the testing of the harvested blood so 
that stem cells could be extracted without contamination; (3) the 
processing of the blood in order to extract stem cells for later therapeutic 
use; (4) the storage and preservation of the blood and stem cells; and (5) 
 
 315. Id. at ¶¶ 77-79. 
 316. Id. at ¶ 75. 
 317. Id. at ¶¶ 69, 71-72. 
 318. Case C-86/09, Future Health Tech. Ltd v. The Comm’rs For Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs, 2010 E.C.R. I-5215, at ¶ 52. 
 319. Id. at ¶ 49. 
 320. Id. at ¶ 3. 
 321. Id. at ¶¶ 25-27. 
36
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss4/3
2019] STEM CELL PATENTABILITY IN THE EU 1013 
the release of blood upon the request of the parents of the child.322 The 
firm seeking the exemption from VAT, Future Health Technologies Ltd 
(“FHT”), was a private stem cell services provider that would provide 
parents of a soon-to-be-born child with a kit to be used by a qualified 
health professional (who would be compensated by the parents for his or 
her services, separately) to collect blood from the umbilical cord at 
birth.323 Then, FHT would provide cryptopreservation, storage, testing, 
and analysis services that would allow the parents to tap into the blood 
and stem cells at the later request of the parents if therapeutic treatment 
was needed.324 The ECJ found from the existing court records that the 
British government at one time believed that the collection and testing of 
the blood and stem cells would be exempt from VAT, but the storage 
services were not exempt.325 The British government later changed its 
position and contended that none of the services provided by FHT could 
fall within the VAT exemption because the services could not be 
separated into individual transactions.326  
While deciding that none of the services offered by FHT were within 
the scope of the VAT exemption, the ECJ stated that the various 
exemptions within the VAT—both in Directive 2006/112 and the former 
Sixth Directive—were not designed to exempt all activities that would be 
considered within the public interest.327 Instead, the exemptions were 
more so present to prevent the member-states from diverging on what 
transactions should and should not be exempted from the VAT.328 Next, 
the ECJ stated that while services within the scope of the hospital and 
medical care VAT exemption are for therapeutic aims and the protecting, 
maintaining, and restoring of human health, the mere collecting, testing, 
and storing of umbilical cord blood and stem cells are not services 
directed at the actual diagnosis, treatment, or cure of human health 
problems nor for the maintenance, restoration, or protection of human 
health.329 In contrast, the ECJ believed that the services provided by FHT 
would ensure that the resource for the later, potential therapeutic 
treatment, maintenance, restoration, and/or protection of human health 
and that what FHT was providing in terms of services had no bearing on 
diagnosis, treatment, and/or cure of human disease.330 The ECJ also 
declared that it made no difference whether the services offered by FHT 
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were offered individually or collectively in terms of whether they 
resembled “hospital and medical care” for the purposes of the VAT 
exemption.331 
In another case, the ECJ held that for purposes of the VAT exemption, 
the removal of joint cartilage cells from a human patient’s cartilage 
material and the later multiplication of those cells for reimplantation for 
therapeutic purposes falls within the definition of “provision of medical 
care” as defined by the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC.332 In Germany v. 
VTSI, the results and material involving human tissue cells were treated 
as a service yet the locale of the service and whether the transaction 
involved was subject to a VAT exemption were in dispute.333 VTSI was 
a German-based biotechnology services firm engaged generally in the 
fields of research, development, production, and marketing of 
technologies to diagnose and treat human tissue diseases with the focus 
on diseases affecting human cartilage.334 Specific to this case, VTSI 
would engage in the multiplication of chondrocytes for reimplantation 
into a patient whereby the doctors and/or clinics referring the work to 
VTSI would be located in other EU member-states.335 In a typical 
business transaction, VTSI would be sent cartilage taken from a human 
patient for a biopsy and VTSI would treat the tissue to make it possible to 
remove the chondrocytes.336 After preparing the chondrocyte cells in their 
own blood serum, the resulting cells may or may not be introduced into a 
collagen membrane leading to the production of a cartilage plaster that 
would be sent back to the referring doctor or clinic residing in another 
member-state and then reimplanted in the patient.337 VTSI believed that 
its services were not subject to the VAT because its referring doctors and 
clinics were located in other member-states.338 The German government 
disagreed, arguing that cell movement from doctor/clinic/patient to VTSI 
in what the German government called a “short-term separation from the 
body” and cell multiplications did not constitute “work” pursuant to 
German law.339 Interestingly enough, the referring German court held that 
VTSI’s customers (doctors and clients) had used the VAT identification 
numbers issued to them by the member-state in which those customers 
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resided and thus the transactions were not taxable in Germany.340 
additionally, the referring German court believed that the transfer of the 
multiplied cartilage cells by VTSI to the doctor/clinic/patient did not 
make those cells a supply of goods since VTSI did not have the authority 
to dispose of the cells freely.341  
The Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC states that the supply of goods or 
services occurs where the supplier has established a business and/or has a 
fixed establishment from which the service is supplied or, in cases 
whereby those two possibilities do not exist, a place where there exists a 
permanent address or a usual residence.342 However, in cases where the 
subject matter of the service involves work on tangible, movable property, 
the service locale is the place where the services are physically 
conducted.343 Also specific to tangible movable property, the services 
locale in cases where a customer has been issued a VAT tax identification 
number should be the member-state where the same member-state has 
issued that VAT tax identification number.344 The ECJ also reminded the 
reader that the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC exempts transactions that 
provide medical care by medical or paramedical professions from the 
VAT.345 German law also dictates that the service locale should be the 
member-state that issued the VAT tax identification number and also 
provides exemptions from VAT for activities involving doctors, dentists, 
lay medical practitioners, physiotherapists, midwives, and/or similar 
professional activities.346 
The ECJ stated that the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC should be 
considered to encompass a wide range of transactions for the purposes of 
taxability, but that exemptions from VAT should be interpreted narrowly 
since the general principle of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC is to levy 
the VAT on all goods and services provided by a taxable person.347 The 
ECJ also articulated that the exemptions should be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the objectives supporting the exemptions and thus the 
strictness of interpretation should not interfere with the intended effects 
of the exemptions.348 According to the ECJ, in regard to the exemption 
provided by the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC for the provision of medical 
care for therapeutic purposes, while citing CopyGene, the therapeutic 
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purpose itself should not be defined narrowly and that the removal of 
cartilage materials to extract cells for multiplication and later 
reimplantation in a human patient is clearly therapeutic.349 The ECJ 
declared that the activities engaged in by VTSI were within the definition 
of “provision of medical care” pursuant to the Sixth Directive 
77/388/EEC and such a determination supports the goal of that particular 
VAT exemption which is to reduce the cost of medical care.350 
Additionally, the ECJ stated that VTSI’s activities should not be found to 
be outside the definition of “provision of medical care” given that the cells 
were extracted from a human patient and later reimplanted into the same 
or another patient.351 
C. Access to records. 
Although perhaps a minor case in regard to the full scope of law that 
governs stem cell use and research in the EU, the ECJ’s decision in 
Sweden v. Commission does help paint the four corners of this area of law 
in that it addresses the issue of patient and parental rights.352 It also 
provides the practitioner with an idea as to how transparent the EU 
governmental institutions are in regard to its records and correspondence 
with member-states.353 In Sweden, two parents lost their son due to a 
therapeutic treatment procedure involving the use of autologous stem 
cells which took place in a private clinic in Germany.354 The parents stated 
that the private clinic was not able to engage in the treatment due to 
inaction by the German government in breach of EU law governing the 
use of advanced therapy medicinal products.355 The EU Commission 
launched an investigation into the death through use of an EU Pilot 
procedure by contacting the German government authorities directly to 
gain information pursuant to the parents’ complaint.356 The German 
government complied with the EU Commission’s two requests for 
information.357 However, after being petitioned by the parents for the 
documents comprising the German government’s response to the EU 
Commission, the European Commission rejected access to the specific 
documents and replied to the parents that they were not able to find fault 
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on the part of the German government.358 
The foundation of the EU’s Pilot procedure is found in Regulation 
1049/2001 which provides for access to public records to the greatest 
extent possible but also allows certain public and private interests to be 
protected through a set of exceptions that are collectively designed to 
allow EU governmental institutions to fulfill their internal functions, 
especially when personal data is involved.359 Specifically, the EU 
governmental bodies can deny records to citizens when the disclosure of 
such records could undermine the purpose of inspections, investigations, 
and audits, unless there is an overriding public interest in making those 
records open to request.360 More narrowly, Regulation 1049/2001 states 
that the above-mentioned limitations on the disclosure of records applies 
to documents that EU governmental institutions have crafted or have 
received.361 
While upholding the decision of the EU Commission to refuse to 
provide the parents of the deceased with the documents delivered to it by 
the German government, the ECJ stated that there does not exist a general 
overriding interest.362 Instead, evaluation of an overriding interest must 
be found on the specific facts of the case at the time the facts arise.363 
Narrow to the facts of the case at bar, the ECJ found that the parents’ 
general assertion that they needed access to the documents in order to 
protect human health without providing specific allegations as to how and 
why the documents would have protected human health was not sufficient 
to establish an overriding interest.364 In order to establish an overriding 
interest promoting the disclosure of the requested documents, there must 
be a specific need that is met by such disclosure.365 
D. Legal notice. 
While the ECJ’s decision in Commission v. Poland clearly touches on 
the issue of human biological tissues and cells, it is also illustrative of the 
responsibility of a member-state to meet its obligations under EU law.366 
Directive 2004/23/EC, implemented through a procedures dictated in 
Directive 2006/86/EC, requires that member-states adopt certain 
administrative procedures in handling human tissues and cells which 
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cover activities such donation, procurement, storage, testing, processing, 
preservation, and distribution.367 A member-state is deemed to have 
fulfilled its obligations when it officially publishes the requirement set 
forth by an EU directive in its specific law.368 Directive 2006/23/EC 
requires that each collection of donated biological material be assigned a 
single European code at the time and place of donation and that the main 
characteristics and properties of those tissues and cells be identified at the 
same time.369 Associated with Directives 2004/23/EC and 2006/86/EC is 
Directive 2006/17/EC, which requires member-state governments to 
ensure that the donors of reproductive cells undergo biological tests and 
also states requirements for those tests.370 
The Polish law in question did identify procedures for the removal, 
storage, and transplantation of several forms of biological material 
including cells, tissues, and organs; but, its law stated that these 
procedures did not apply to the removal and transplant activities involving 
reproductive cells, gonads, fetal tissues, embryonic tissues, reproductive 
organs, or any associated elements thereof.371 Because the Polish law 
excluded from its procedures requirements—identified in EU Directives 
2004/23/EC, 2006/17/EC, and 2006/86/EC—on the handling of 
reproductive cells, fetal tissue, and embryonic tissue, the EU Commission 
charged the member-state with failing to meeting its obligations under EU 
law.372 The Polish government disputed the alleged failure to meet its 
obligations under EU law, stating that although it had not exactly word 
for word transposed the requirements of the various Directives into Polish 
law, it could cite several other sources of domestic law in the form of acts, 
including laws governing the medical and dental professions, health care 
law generally, laboratory medicine, patient rights, and personal data 
collection, that maintained the same requirements as the Directives with 
the same intended force of law.373 
The EU Commission countered the Polish government’s argument by 
contending, first, that the member-state could not explain as to why the 
procedural requirements required by the EU Directives applied to some 
forms of human biological matter but not for reproductive cells, gonads, 
fetal tissue, and embryonic tissue.374 Second, the EU Commission 
believed that the Polish government’s attempt at adopting the 
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requirements of the EU Directives was not clear and precise and therefore 
constituted measures that would not be mandatory as required by the 
Directives.375 More narrowly, the EU Commission’s concern was that the 
domestic law cited by Poland consisted largely of administrative rules 
governing medical practice that could be freely amended, are not always 
properly disseminated, and, thus, lack binding authority.376 
The ECJ held that, by excluding reproductive cells, fetal tissue, and 
embryonic tissue, Poland failed to meet its obligations by transposing the 
EU Directives into its domestic law.377 According to the ECJ, Poland’s 
attempt at codifying the requirements of the EU Directives, as Poland 
contends that it did in its domestic law, was insufficient because the 
sources of law cited by Poland varied in their legal nature and included 
non-binding acts and general applications of Polish civil and criminal 
law.378 The ECJ was clear in stating that a member-state does not meet its 
obligations pursuant to the requirements of EU law by identifying various 
sources of law of questionable applicability, while also identifying 
specific exclusions in coverage.379 The ECJ also stated that any 
transposition of EU law into domestic law must be clear and precise so 
that individuals understand their rights and obligations so that these rights 
and obligations can be invoked in front of national courts.380 Perhaps most 
damaging to Poland’s argument that its collection of domestic law 
provided the necessary procedural requirements associated with the 
handling and processing of human biological material was the fact that 
the domestic law did not mention the EU Directives as the EU Directives 
required when the domestic law was published.381 
E. Funding for stem cell research. 
Any reader of One of Us v. Commission will learn extensively about 
the EU’s democratic, legislative, and judicial processes, and how under 
three provisions of the TFEU, Articles 225 (ex 192, 138b), 227 (ex 194, 
138d), and 241 (ex 208, 152), along with Regulation 211/2011, provide 
individuals and interest groups with unique access to the EU 
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government.382 In One of Us, an interest group calling itself “One of Us” 
proposed a set of changes to EU legislation through the European 
Citizens’ Initiative (“ECI”) with the general purpose of “the juridical 
protection of the dignity, the right to life and of the integrity of every 
human being from conception in the areas of EU competence in which 
such protection is of particular importance.”383 More narrowly, the ECI 
defined the human embryo as the beginning of development of the human 
body, ensured consistency within EU law whereby the life of the human 
embryo is at stake, and created a general ban on, and an end to, EU 
financial support for activities leading to the destruction of human 
embryos.384 Narrower still, One of Us called for specific language that 
excluded EU funding for research activities that destroyed human 
embryos for the purposes of obtaining human stem cells and research that 
involves steps leading to the garnering of human embryonic stem cells.385 
More broadly, however, the ECI also proposed language that would 
prohibit the EU from funding abortion activities directly or from funding 
other organizations that either encourage or promote abortion.386 The 
position taken by One of Us was clearly provoked by the ECJ’s decision 
in Brustle.387 
After entertaining the ECI, the EU Commission refused to take action 
on the recommendations included within it on several grounds. First, all 
EU legislation on the subject matter at issue must comply with both the 
TFEU and the European Charter of Rights and Freedoms regarding 
human dignity, right to life, and the right to the integrity of the person 
which, according to the EU Commission, includes activities involving 
stem cell research.388 Second, the EU Commission stated that the thrust 
of the ECJ’s decision in Brustle was not to address the research activities 
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of individuals and firms within the EU in regard to stem cells, but to only 
address the issue of patentability of such related inventions.389 Third, the 
EU Commission commented on the EU’s Horizon 2020 research and 
innovation program and defended the program as one that operated within 
a strict ethical framework consisting of a “triple lock” system providing 
three safeguards that included: (1) the respect for national legislation in 
this area of research; (2) that all research projects were subject to peer 
review pursuant to a rigorous ethical review; and (3) that EU funds could 
not be used for derivation of new stem cell lines or for research that 
destroyed embryos or for the procurement of stem cells.390 The EU 
Commission argued that the triple lock system removed many of the 
concerns put forth in the ECI by One of Us, as both the EU Parliament 
and the EU Council had considered ethical issues when crafting Horizon 
2020.391 Fourth, the EU Commission contended that all of its funded 
activities which require coordination among the member-states meet the 
standards sent by the Millennium Development Goals and the 
International Conference on Population and Development Program of 
Action, the latter of which has identified unsafe abortion practices as an 
area of major concern for public health.392 Fifth, and more generally on 
the subject of EU budget, the EU Commission argued that all 
expenditures made by the EU in the areas of research and developmental 
cooperation respect the priorities of human dignity, the right to life, and 
the right to the integrity of the person.393 Lastly, and most politically, the 
EU Commission noted that the real mission behind the ECI articulated by 
One of Us was to reduce the number of abortions in developing countries 
where the EU provides assistance; and that the existing EU programs 
indeed accomplish this mission by way of activities designed to provide 
access to various health services including family planning, 
contraception, newborn and child health services, and sex education.394 
Although the procedural matters associated with One of Us are beyond 
the scope of this work, it should be noted that the EU Commission, EU 
Parliament, EU Council, and the International Planned Parenthood 
Federation first argued that the interest group and namesake of the case 
did not have the authority to submit the ECI nor have it addressed by the 
ECJ pursuant to Regulation 211/2011.395 The ECJ, however, believed that 
it should entertain the petition brought by One of Us pursuant to 
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Regulation 211/2011.396 Thus, the ECJ has authority to determine whether 
the content of the ECI as submitted to the EU Commission should be 
forwarded on to the EU Parliament and EU Council for its consideration 
when drafting new legislation on the subject matter.397 
Specific to the subject of ethical considerations in the area of research 
on human embryos and stem cells, One of Us contended that the triple 
lock system was an inadequate system to safeguard the interests of human 
dignity because the mere observance of a member-state’s national law 
does not set ethical standards and, therefore, the protections for human 
dignity rest with the lone philosophy of the member-state.398 Additionally, 
One of Us articulated that a peer review system only ensures that research 
is conducted pursuant to current scientific standards.399 One of Us also 
believed that the prohibition of the use of EU funds for derivation of new 
stem cell lines, for research involving the destruction of human embryos 
and/or research for the procurement of stem cells, does not go far enough 
to protect human dignity since a ban does not exist for the financing of 
projects that presuppose the destruction of human embryos.400 Lastly, 
One of Us remarked that adherence to the standards set by the Millennium 
Development Goals and the International Conference on Population and 
Development Program of Action were mere policy objectives and do not 
bind member-states in the traditional manner of law.401 Thus, One of Us 
was concerned that member-states can freely allow abortions as a 
recourse and that the EU’s funding priorities do not demonstrate how the 
financial support for access to abortion reduces maternal mortality.402 
Despite these policy concerns, the ECJ made clear that the EU 
Commission should be granted considerable lee-way when drawing 
legislation because the EU Commission must (1) promote the general 
interest of the EU and (2) reconcile divergent interests across the EU 
member-states.403 Likewise, the ECJ agreed with the EU Commission’s 
point of view that the Brustle decision, although it did identify a human 
embryo as the point at which a human ovum is fertilized, only addressed 
scientific research on human embryos and stem cells to the point by which 
the outcome might be patented, and did not address how such research 
should be conducted and funded.404 The ECJ viewed the ECI’s approach 
to human dignity as equating a human embryo as a human being and then 
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assessing the right to human dignity and the right to life to that human 
embryo.405 The ECJ found the EU Commission’s ethical approach to, 
although take into account the rights to life and human dignity for human 
embryos, take into consideration the potential for the discovery of 
treatments for diseases that are currently incurable and/or life threatening, 
such as Parkinson’s, stroke, diabetes, heart disease, and blindness.406 In 
an attempt to harmonize the two positions, the ECJ found that the EU 
Commission’s ethical approach was not one of error, but merely one of 
difference in contrast to the approach preferred by One of Us.407 The ECJ 
also, while citing a World Health Organization publication, stated that the 
practice of unsafe abortions was indeed a threat to maternal health and a 
source of mortality; thus, the funding of certain related services does 
reduce the likelihood of death for pregnant women.408 
F. Common customs tariff. 
In a case that sheds light on the vast issues an inventor, firm, or 
practitioner may face in the EU regarding stem cell research, the ECJ took 
a deep dive into the chemistry of a product containing stem cells to 
determine its appropriate nomenclature for the purposes of Regulation 
2658/87, which constitutes the Common Customs Tariff for the EU.409 In 
Abbott GmbH v. Germany, the parties disagreed on the proper 
classification of a product that was essentially a medical testing kit used 
to determine the presence of certain substances in human serum and 
plasma.410 The test kits were designed for retail sale and contained various 
laboratory reagents, where the essential character of the product was a 
monoclonal diagnostic reagent that takes a B-lymphoctye-type stem cell 
from spleen plasma in a donor animal.411 The lymphocyte, which is 
responsible for producing the desired monoclonal antibody, is then fused 
with a cancer cell and the new cell produced following the fusion, called 
a hybridoma, is later cultivated in a suitable medium for multiplication.412 
According to the ECJ, the B-lymphocytes are blood fractions, as are the 
monoclonal antibodies hidden in the blood by the B-lymphocytes, and 
thus should be categorized pursuant to the Common Customs Tariff as 
“antisera and other blood fractions” and anything possessing a 
 
 405. Id. at ¶ 176. 
 406. Id.  
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. at ¶ 180. 
 409. Case C-191/91, Abbott GmbH v. Germany, 1993 E.C.R. I-867, at ¶¶ 10-13, 16. 
 410. Id. at ¶¶ 1-3. 
 411. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 10. 
 412. Id. at ¶ 11. 
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monoclonal diagnostic reagent should be labeled as such.413 
G. Free movement of goods. 
In a case that could impact both stem cell-containing and non-stem cell-
containing elements of blood donations, the ECJ held that Articles 34 (ex 
28, 30) and 36 (ex 30, 36) of the TFEU do not allow a member-states to 
prohibit the inter-member-state shipments of blood products when the 
donors of those blood products have been compensated for their 
donations.414 Generally, Article 34 of the TFEU prohibits restrictions on 
imports moving from one member-state to the next while Article 36 
provides exceptions to the free movement of goods when justified in order 
to protect the health and life of humans.415 The free movement of goods 
is one of the fundamental freedoms of the TFEU and, according to the 
ECJ, the exception permitted in Article 36 can only be justified in the face 
of Article 34 if the restriction imposed by a member-state is appropriate 
to the attainment of the member-state’s goal and does not go beyond what 
is necessary to attain that goal.416  
In Humanplasma, the ECJ was called on by the Austrian courts to 
determine whether Article 34 should prevent the application of Austrian 
law, which prohibited the importation of erythrocyte concentrates from 
Germany when the blood materials were donated by donors which had 
received some form of compensation.417 The Austrian law in question 
governing “medicinal imports” stated that such materials could only be 
imported if the governmental body with the appropriate authority deemed 
the materials as safe for the market.418 The Austrian law also had strict 
requirements regarding: (1) the donor’s identity, (2) proof that the donor 
had been chosen, (3) donation compliance with relevant international 
laws on the subject, and (4) proof the donor was not suffering from 
identified viral infections.419 The Austrian law was later amended to 
strictly prohibit blood materials from being placed on the market in 
 
 413. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 13, 16. 
 414. Case C-421/09, Humanplasma GmbH v. Republik Osterreich, 2010, E.C.R. I-12871, at ¶ 46. 
 415. Id. at ¶¶ 31-32. Article 30 (ex 28, 30) of the TFEU reads: “Quantitative restrictions on imports 
and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States.” TFEU art. 30; 
Article 36 (ex 30, 36) of the TFEU reads: “The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude 
prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, 
public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the 
protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of 
industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions, however, constitute a means of 
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.” TFEU art. 36. 
 416. Id. at ¶ 34. 
 417. Id. at ¶ 23. 
 418. Id. at ¶ 8. 
 419. Id. at ¶ 9. 
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Austria if the donor had been compensated in any way, except for cases 
where the blood harvesting establishment was in immediate need for a 
donation based on an emergency (in such case, only expenses of the donor 
would be reimbursed).420 However, the definition of an emergency under 
Austrian law did not include the need for blood materials for rare blood 
types.421 Additionally, Austrian law required that all importers of blood 
materials covered by the law certify that blood materials were donated 
without any form of compensation whatsoever unless the emergency 
clause applied.422 
Directive 2002/98/EC, another form of statutory law, covers the quality 
and safety of human blood and blood components when they are 
collected, tested, processed, stored, and distributed.423 Specifically, 
Directive 2002/98/EC, while incorporating reference to Article 168 (ex 
152, 129) of the TFEU, provides that member-states of the EU are 
allowed to impose stricter guidelines for quality and safety standards for 
blood and blood components than what is provided for in the Directive 
itself.424 Directive 2002/98/EC states that the idea of voluntary and unpaid 
donations of blood materials are a factor which contribute to the safety of 
such materials, thus contributing to human health. Additionally, Directive 
2002/98/EC provides that a lack of compensation for blood donations 
should be promoted and donors should receive greater public 
recognition.425 The Directive also allows member-states to impose the 
method by which voluntary and unpaid donations are regulated, including 
a prohibition and/or restriction of imported blood materials if those 
methods imposed by the member-state are not met by the importer.426 
Lastly, Directive 2002/98/EC identifies the required testing protocols for 
blood and blood materials.427 Directive 2002/98/EC also references 
Article 2 of Recommendation No R (95) 14 of the Council of Europe, 
which covers the protection of donors and their health in regard to 
harvesting blood materials and also endorses: (1) the lack of payment to 
donors and (2) that such donations should be voluntary, and not 
compensated by cash or anything that might be a substitute for cash, 
including time off for work, unless the time off for work would include 
merely the time it takes to donate and travel to the donation site.428 The 
 
 420. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 12. 
 421. Id. 
 422. Id. at ¶ 11. 
 423. Id. at ¶ 3. 
 424. Id. 
 425. Id. 
 426. Id. at ¶ 4. 
 427. Id. at ¶ 6. 
 428. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 7. 
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Council of Europe Recommendation does state that refreshments and 
reimbursement for direct travel costs are compatible with voluntary and 
unpaid donations.429  
The ECJ found the Austrian law incompatible with Articles 34 and 36 
because, although Directive 2002/98/EC does give member-states the 
leeway to impose stricter standards for the safeguard of human health in 
regard to blood and blood donations, the Austrian law goes beyond what 
is necessary to meet the goal of protecting human life.430 This is because 
the Directive identifies the testing protocol for such substances which 
ensures the safety of humans, which is more protective than a requirement 
that a blood materials importer guarantee that all donors were voluntary 
and were also not compensated for their donations.431 The ECJ mentioned 
that Directive 2002/98/EC and Council of Europe Recommendation No 
R (95) 14 do not require donors to act voluntarily and donate without 
compensation; rather, these two forms of statutory law strongly encourage 
such practices.432 In fact, the Council of Europe Recommendation 
acknowledged that donors could receive small tokens, refreshments, time 
off from work for direct travel and donation time, and reimbursement for 
travel costs.433 
VI. DECISIONS FROM THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE. 
The Board of Appeals of the European Patent Office’s (“BOAEPO”) 
decision in Howard Florey provided several important declarative 
statements on not only the patentability of a particular subject matter, but 
also on the relationship between the EPC and Directive 98/44/EC.434 
Before settling on whether the elucidation of the genetic sequence of the 
H2-relaxin gene was patentable under the EPC, the BOAEPO stated that 
Article 53 of the EPC was applicable to cases filed with the BOAEPO 
before Directive 98/44/EC was enacted as well as afterward, and that 
Rules 23(b) and 23(e) were only designed to give Article 53 a more 
detailed interpretation.435 Additionally, the BOAEPO stated that it would 
interpret Directive 98/44/EC in the same way that it interprets Article 53 
of the EPC.436 
In Howard Florey, two oppositions were filed against the EPO’s initial 
 
 429. Id. at ¶ 7. 
 430. Id. at ¶¶ 44, 45. 
 431. Id. at ¶¶ 39, 42-43. 
 432. Id. at ¶ 44. 
 433. Id. at ¶ 44. 
 434. Case T-0272/95, Howard Florey Institute v. Aglietta, (1999) E.C.R. 
ECLI:EP:BA:1999:T027295.19990415.  
 435. Id. at 4, 9. 
 436. Id. at 9. 
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decision to grant a patent with the title “Molecular cloning and 
characterization of a further gene sequence coding for human relaxin.”437 
According to the opinion, the oppositions were filed by a “green faction” 
of the European Parliament based on three grounds including: lack of 
novelty under Article 54 of the EPC, lack of inventive step under Article 
56 of the EPC, lack of invention under Article 52, and subject matter in 
violation of the prohibition against patentability for inventions that violate 
the public order and morality clause within Article 53.438 Interestingly 
enough, the Opposition Division of the EPO found that an invention 
associated with a human gene would not present a bar to patentability 
because it would not be considered “outrageous,” to which the Opposition 
Division defined as something akin to patenting life since DNA was not 
life itself but rather a chemical entity involved in a biological process.439 
Thus, since the invention was not outrageous, there existed no offense to 
human dignity because the woman who donated the tissue provided 
consent and her self-determination was not affected by the exploitation of 
the claimed molecules.440 
On the issue of patentability in relation to a potential bar based on a 
violation of morality or public order, the appellants (i.e., the opposition) 
in Howard Florey contended that the subject matter that supported the 
grant of a patent was an exception to patentability under Article 53 of the 
EPC because the invention was based on a derivation of a person’s body 
and thus a violation of a person’s fundamental rights.441 Furthermore, 
according to the appellants, the genetic material that supported the patent 
was really just genetic material whereby the inventor merely “cracked the 
code” by discovering the number and sequence of human relaxin genes.442 
Therefore, a discovery did not really exist since the substance supporting 
the patent had been around for thousands of years. Lastly, the appellants 
argued that an inventive step did not exist as the isolation of the genetic 
material involved well-known techniques and was performed with no 
difficulties, and that prior art made the invention nonobvious.443 In 
contrast, the respondents (those defending the grant of patent protection) 
stated that Rule 23 of the EPC provides four categories of 
biotechnological inventions that are not patentable and the subject matter 
in question did not fall into any of those categories.444 The respondents 
 
 437. Id. at 1. European patent No. 0 112 149. 
 438. Id. at 2. 
 439. Id.  
 440. Id. 
 441. Id. at 4. 
 442. Id. at 4-5. 
 443. Id. 
 444. Id. at 6. 
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also articulated that Rule 23 makes clear the eligibility of patent for 
inventions consisting of the isolation of elements of the body and the 
technical processes that support that isolation and the H2-relaxin DNA 
fell into that description.445 In regard to novelty and inventive step, the 
respondents declared that no prior art existed involving H2-relaxin and 
there existed no suspicion that H2-relaxin existed.446 
The BOAEPO agreed with the respondents that Rule 23 provided a list 
of what is barred by the EPC in regard to biotechnological patents. The 
BOAEPO also stated that Rule 23 provided a non-exhaustive list of 
prohibitions and that Article 53 of the EPC could go further in prohibiting 
the patentability of subject matter involving material originating from the 
human body.447 However, the BOAEPO found that the process for the 
elucidation of the H2-relaxin gene was a patentable subject matter as it 
did not fall into the specific prohibitions found in Rule 23 nor did it fall 
within the confines of the more general prohibitions potentially associated 
with EPC Article 53.448 Additionally, the BOAEPO found the invention 
to be novel as it did not find prior art associated with the H2-relaxin gene 
nor anything relative to the sequences of the gene or the corresponding 
H2-relaxin protein.449 Lastly, the BOAEPO found the invention to 
properly involve an inventive step. It found that a skilled person engaged 
in the science would not have known that a similar cloning technique used 
in the invention at issue would work despite some similar techniques 
existing, specifically involving the use of rats and hogs given that the 
sequence of human relaxin was not known.450 
The Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office’s 
(“EBAEPO”) decision in Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation 
(“WARF”) is perhaps the best case outlining both the relationship between 
the EPO’s judicial tribunals and the ECJ.451 Although the case originated 
with the question of whether the inventor’s patent application could 
withstand the prohibitions on patentability set forth in Article 53 and Rule 
28 of the EPC, the jurisdictional question answered by the EBAEPO 
settled that the condition of the relationship between the EPO and the ECJ 
in that the former does not have the authority to ask the latter for a 
preliminary ruling.452 In WARF, the patent applicant submitted that since 
Rule 28(c) (ex 23d) mirrored the language in Article 6(2)(C) of Directive 
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98/44/EC, there existed a question of EU law to which the question of 
patentability should be resolved by the ECJ.453 The applicant further 
contended that the EBAEPO should be treated similarly to a EU member-
state’s national court since the vast number of member-states of the EPC 
are also member-states of the ECJ.454 Lastly, the applicant argued that by 
not asking the ECJ for a ruling now risked the reality that EU member-
state national courts will interpret Article 6 of Directive 98/44/EC in a 
dissimilar manner than required by the EPO.455  
The EBAEPO discounted this argument on several grounds. First, the 
EBAEPO made note of the fact that the EPC itself nor the implementing 
regulations identify any situation whereby the EPO should refer questions 
of law to the ECJ and the EPO is a creation of the EPC in which the latter 
is the provider of the former’s scope of authority.456 Second, the EPO’s 
judicial organs, although they may be treated as traditional courts, are not 
constructs of the EU but instead part of the EPC which is an international 
organization that maintains its own set of member-states, not all of which 
are part of the EU.457 Third, the fact that EPC was amended to include 
language that mirrors Directive 98/44/EC on the patentability of 
biotechnological inventions does not allow the EPO to refer cases to the 
ECJ as some of the contracting states to the EPC are not part of the EU.458 
Additionally, and relatedly, according to the EBAEPO, the EPC only 
states that Directive 98/44/EC should be used as a supplementary source 
of interpretation for EPC Rules 26 through 29.459 Fourth, the EBAEPO 
stated that it made no difference that the EPO’s judicial bodies were 
located in Germany, an EU member-state.460 Lastly, the EBAEPO stated 
that it was not aware of any precedent allowing for the EPO to refer a case 
to the ECJ.461 
On the issue of patentability of the subject matter at issue in the patent 
application, the EBAEPO in WARF held that the patent application could 
not be sustained in the face of Article 53’s prohibition against inventions 
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that could only be obtained by the destruction of human embryos.462 After 
making clear that Rules 26 through 29 were added to the EPC to 
harmonize the EPC with Directive 98/44/EC, the EBAEPO stated that it 
would focus its decision on an interpretation of the Directive and look at 
the ordinary meaning of the substance of the Directive pursuant to the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.463 According to the EBAEPO, 
Directive 98/44/EC’s Article 6(2)(c) prohibits the patenting of an 
invention if a human embryo is used for industrial or commercial 
purposes. This language was the result of EU legislative intent to prevent 
the commodification of human embryos whereby one of the essential 
functions of the Directive’s language was to protect human dignity.464 The 
EBAEPO disagreed with the patent applicant’s position that since the EU 
actually funds some forms of research on human embryos, the EU must 
have not wanted to prohibit inventions such as the one at issue.465 In 
contrast, the EBAEPO stated that the EU’s selective funding of such 
research does not allow for such an interpretation nor does the fact that 
the term embryo was not defined by the Directive nor EPC Rule 28, while 
the term is defined in the law of some member-states.466 
The more technical part of the EBAEPO’s decision in WARF focused 
on the actual invention as the patent applicant contended was that in order 
for the patent application to be denied, human embryos must actually be 
claimed in the application.467 According to the EBAEPO, not only must 
the explicit wording of the application have to be examined, but also the 
technical teaching of the application, as well as the method by which the 
invention is performed.468 On this point, the EBAEPO firmly stated that 
since the human embryos had to be destroyed in order to produce the stem 
cell cultures claimed in the patent application, the patent could not be 
granted.469 The EBAEPO argued that to do otherwise would allow an 
inventor who develops a process or product that destroys human embryos 
to gain a patent through the artful crafting of a patent application by 
avoiding language depicting the entire process.470 Lastly, while 
addressing the application of the phrase found in Directive 98/44/EC, “for 
industrial and commercial purposes,” the EBAEPO found that the patent 
applicant could not argue that the invention did not meet this standard 
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since the invention itself was for human embryonic stem cell cultures and 
not the use of actual human embryos.471 Instead, the EBAEPO held that 
when an inventor, such as in the case of this patent application, must go 
through a process (the destruction of human embryos) to get the product 
(human embryonic stem cell cultures) that fits the definition of “for 
industrial and commercial purposes.”472  
In a case that was temporarily stalled by the EPO in anticipation of the 
outcome of WARF to allow case law on this issue to develop, the 
BOAEPO stated that auxiliary statements added to a previous application 
could not save the patent application from failing on grounds of lack of 
patentability under EPC Article 53 and Rule 28 (ex 23).473 In California 
Institute of Technology (“CalTech”), the namesake patent applicant 
sought a patent for an in vitro method of proliferating a clonal population 
of stem cells whereby the stem cells were capable of self-renewal but the 
culture where the stem cells would rest would not contain fetal calf serum 
to produce a population of neural crest-stem cells.474 However, in an 
auxiliary request, the patent applicant added the phrase “wherein the cells 
are not derived from an embryo” just after the phrase “mammalian neural 
crest stem cells” and also added the phrase “capable of being derived from 
adult tissue” after the phrase “mammalian neural crest stem cells,” 
seemingly in an attempt to save the application’s patentability.475 
Immediately following the EPO’s release of the WARF decision, the EPO 
stated that applicant’s application would fail on lack of patentability 
grounds based on Article 53 and Rule 28.476 Interestingly enough, the 
applicant withdrew its request for oral proceedings and did not object 
against the EPO’s initial rejection, following the notification by the EPO 
the EPO held the oral proceedings in abstentia.477 According to the 
BOAEPO, the central issue in the matter was whether the patent 
 
 471. Id.  
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application possessed subject matter that was in violation of the 
prohibition found in Article 53 and Rule 28 on the patenting of material 
or processes involving the use of human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes.478 After making clear that Article 53 and Rule 28 
prohibit both products and methods that lead to the destruction of a human 
embryo, the BOAEPO found that the application later after Claim 1 
explained that the process stated that “the caudal-most 10 somites are 
dissected from early embryos” with the isolation process further 
described.479 The BOAEPO found in the end that the two added phrases 
were not satisfactory disclaimers that could save the application’s 
patentability, given that a complete reading of the application, according 
to the BOAEPO, did not completely leave out the possibility of the use of 
human embryos.480 
In Sangamo BioSciences, the BOAEPO found that although a patent 
applicant had used human embryonic stem cells in the research and 
process leading up to the invention, the applicant sufficiently disclaimed 
that portion of the invention.481 In contrast to Claim 1 of the originally 
filed patent application, Claim 1 had been altered in a way that restricted 
the claim to a method of altering the state of differentiation in an 
embryonic stem cell or population of stem cells, comprising the step of 
administering a ZFP characterized by specific DNA-binding domains but 
with a disclaimer which specifically excluded human embryonic stem 
cells.482 More narrowly, the claim had been changed to seek patent 
protection where the invention included only the embryonic stem cells of 
mice.483 According to the BOAEPO, even though patents will not be 
granted for violations of EPC Article 53, a disclaimer can be used to 
disclaim subject matter which would otherwise be found offensive to the 
EPC but also allows the remainder of the patent application to result in a 
granted patent.484 Once the patentee reduced the claim to allowable 
subject matter, hereby only claiming the method of altering the state of 
differentiation in a non-human stem cell (stem cells from mice), the 
BOAEPO recommended that the patent be granted.485 However, in this 
particular case, the BOAEPO made it clear that the exclusion of the 
human embryonic stem cells did not introduce a new technical teaching 
or disclose any subject matter beyond the application as it was currently 
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filed.486 
Although not specific to stem cell research and patentability, the 
EBAEPO’s decision in Medi-Physics helps shed light on EPC’s lack of 
patentability provisions and the protection of the human body for which 
it presupposes.487 The namesake applicant sought a patent for a surgical 
procedure that essentially involved the delivery of polarized 129-Xe, in 
gaseous, dissolved, or liquid phase, directly to a patient either by 
inhalation or injection directly into the heart.488 The process described in 
the patent application stated that the process could be conducted before 
surgery or during surgery in an attempt to garner additional information 
(in real time) about the patient that could allow a surgeon to determine a 
course of action after receiving the garnered information.489 Essentially, 
the debate at the EPO was whether the process described in the patent 
application was an invasive, risk-bearing surgical procedure or merely a 
non-invasive diagnostic tool; the former would not be considered 
patentable pursuant to EPC Article 53 (ex 52(d)).490 According to the 
EBAEPO, the procedure at issue should be excluded under patentability 
pursuant to Article 53 even if it comprises or encompasses at least one 
feature describing a method that constitutes treatment of a human or an 
animal by surgery or therapy.491 The EBAEPO viewed the description of 
the procedures in the application as an invasive step involving a 
substantial physical intervention of the human body requiring a medical 
professional’s expertise.492 
Although the substantive position of the EBAEPO is important for any 
practitioner seeking patent protection in Europe for a surgical procedure, 
what is more important for the purposes of this work is the discussion by 
the EBAEPO on the balance between patentability and professional 
activity. The EBAEPO, in an obvious fashion, stated that the basic 
purpose of the patent system was to provide and incentivize the 
development of inventions that can benefit the human condition, 
specifically in the field of human medicine.493 The EBAEPO commented 
further that the patent system can be used to protect the investments made 
by inventors as they seek progress in the medical field and more 
specifically, in the area of medical diagnosis.494 However, the EBAEPO 
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in a sympathetic manner also made clear that although Article 53 excludes 
medically-related methods from patentability, the freedom of a 
practitioner to use the discovered methods is still available.495 Further, the 
EBAEPO provided a comparison to the policy in the U.S. whereby 
methods of medical procedure have long been patented, including 
methods for diagnosis. It also stated that practitioners that mimic those 
patented methods cannot be sued for patent infringement.496 
VII. THREATS TO THE HARMONIZATION OF THE LAW GOVERNING STEM 
CELL RESEARCH AND PATENTABILITY. 
When the European Commission first reported on the ability of 
Directive 98/44/EC to harmonize the law on biotechnology throughout 
the EU, the report was negative regarding both the action of member-
states to fully implement the Directive and the ability to achieve legal 
clarity.497 The case law from both the ECJ and the EPO (the BOAEPO 
and EBAEPO inclusive) identified three significant threats to the 
harmonization of the law governing stem cell research and patentability. 
First, and perhaps the most obvious, is that there are 28 member-states the 
EU and 38 contracting members of the EPO, constituting a wide variety 
of social and political cultures. These social and political cultures have 
been enabled by the two primary sources of law, the EPC and Directive 
98/44/EC, and the two primary judicial bodies, the EPO (again, inclusive 
of both the its judicial organs) and the ECJ, to allow member-states to 
determine for themselves what is considered to be against the public order 
and morality. Directive 98/44/EC recognizes the divisions among the 
member-states in regard to their domestic laws on this point and also 
recognizes the threat such divisions pose to harmonization on this topic. 
However, Directive 98/44/EC does not harmonize the law across the EU, 
as this source of law makes clear that patent protection is the domain of a 
member-state’s national law. Further serving as a threat to harmonization, 
Directive 98/44/EC allows member-states to decide best how to conform 
to the EPC corpus of law on biotechnological inventions regarding the 
specific language a member-state can use to meet the conformity 
mandate.  
The second threat to harmonization, and certainly related to the first, is 
that the case law of the ECJ seems to provide member-states with greater 
flexibility instead of a push toward harmonization, despite the ECJ’s 
constant recognition of the need for harmonization. The ECJ’s decision 
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in The Netherlands v. Parliament best illustrates this problem. Although 
the ECJ went to great lengths to state that Directive 98/44/EC is designed 
to keep the internal market harmonized in regard to biotechnology, the 
Directive itself does not create an EU-wide patent and member-states can 
still create their own rules on public order and morality.498 The ECJ in this 
same case stated that Directive 98/44/EC was a legitimate use of the EU’s 
legislative authority to protect the internal market so that member-states 
would apply the law on biotechnology evenly.499 Therefore, what the ECJ 
may have only accomplished is an EU-wide rule endorsing the flexibility 
of member-states to determine their own framework for patent protection 
that could be malleable to meet each member-state’s political and social 
needs but may actually interfere with the internal market. 
The problems associated with flexibility were further endorsed by the 
ECJ in Brustle whereby the ECJ commented that the public order and 
morality prohibition is open to interpretation by member-states and that 
national courts have the ability to rely on their own sense of scientific 
knowledge to define a human embryo.500 The reader of this work should 
be reminded that the ECJ did attempt to define a human embryo, at least 
in part, by declaring that non-fertilized ovum received by transplant and 
non-fertilized ovum whose division has been stimulated by 
parthenogenesis.501 Although the ECJ did state that greater uniformity 
was needed by the EU as to what the complete definition of a human 
embryo should dictate, the ECJ contradicted itself by stating that there 
existed some form of uniform definition and that there should be a greater 
effort toward a uniform definition because member-states are free to use 
their own discretion when determining the scope of a legal definition of a 
human embryo.502 The ECJ did attempt to fill the void left open in Brustle 
by providing a broader definition of a human embryo in International 
Stem Cell, where it declared that a human embryo should include 
whatever could develop into a human being after showing great concern 
for the need for a more complete, EU-wide definition.503 
Although not directly on the point of patentability, the ECJ was 
similarly guilty of providing flexibility to member-states in regard to 
whether biotechnology-related services are exempt from the VAT tax in 
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CopyGene.504 Regardless of whether the reader of the ECJ’s decision in 
CopyGene was the culprit in allowing the flexibility or whether the Sixth 
Directive truly requires the flexibility, the discretion afforded to the 
national courts and governments of the member-states inhibits the ability 
to achieve harmonization in regard to research in biotechnology. 
However, the ECJ assisted with harmonization efforts in stating that the 
stem cell-related activities in question in CopyGene were subject to an 
exemption from VAT. In doing so, the ECH seemingly took away some 
member-state discretion by holding that member-states cannot bar 
exemption for such services even if the true benefits of such services and 
related research may not be determined for years to come.505 
In addition to this last part of the holding in CopyGene, the ECJ did 
recognize the void between an EU Directive and efforts toward 
harmonization in Humanplasma. The ECJ stated that although Directive 
2002/98/EC provides for only a lower barrier for what member-states can 
require for the safety and quality of blood-related materials and that 
member-states can impose stricter guidelines, any set of stricter 
guidelines cannot go beyond what is necessary to ensure safety and 
quality or will otherwise violate the fundamental freedom of free 
movement of goods pursuant to TFEU Articles 30 and 36.506 The 
Humanplasma decision is perhaps the best example in the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence described in this line of work, whereby the ECJ checked 
the discretion held by the member-states in an effort to promote 
harmonization. However, and critically important for the practitioner in 
this area, the Humanplasma decision only served as a harness on an 
importing member-state’s discretion and thus stricter guidelines can be 
imposed by a member-state if the blood-related products are not crossing 
from one EU member-state to another. Therefore, a member-state is 
within its discretion to impose stricter guidelines for the quality and safety 
of blood related products if the products remain wholly within that 
regulating member-state’s political boundaries. 
Although the ECJ could have accomplished more to harmonize the law 
governing stem cell and biotechnological research across the member-
states, the EPO did no better. The BOAEPO’s decision in Howard Florey 
at least curbed a member-state’s discretion in regard to what would 
otherwise be a denial of patentability, by stating that merely because an 
invention is “outrageous” does not mean it does not meet the requirements 
for patentability.507 However, despite this limitation on a member-state’s 
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discretion, the BOAEPO also contended that EPC Rule 23 did not provide 
an exhaustive list of what is prohibited from patentability and in regard to 
the human body, the EPO can adopt additional prohibitions subject to 
EPC Article 53.508 Although it would seem that any additions to the 
category of prohibited inventions would apply equally to all EPC 
member-states, the lack of clarity on this point, especially in an area of 
patentability that is so controversial, will not promote harmonization.  
Any practitioner curious or confused about the relationship between 
the ECJ and the EPO should read the EBAEPO’s decision in WARF. The 
EBAEPO made it clear that the EPO does not have the legal ability to ask 
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.509 Problematically, although EPC Article 
53 and Rules 26-29 are supposed to mirror EU Directive 98/44/EC, there 
exists two independent generators of jurisprudence on the patentability of 
stem cell inventions on the European continent. Further complicating 
matters, the membership of the EU does not mirror the membership of the 
EPO. Therefore, the gulf in the jurisprudence between these two 
institutions, notably a difference in the interpretation of these mirroring, 
yet jurisdictionally separate sources of law, could result in a gross lack of 
harmonization on the topic of stem cell patentability. This schism in 
jurisprudence represents the third threat to harmonization. Although this 
work is narrowly focused on stem cell patentability and research, one can 
imagine other problems associated with a divergence between the EPO 
and EU on other areas of scientific research. 
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GREATER HARMONIZATION AND 
PROMOTION OF STEM CELL AND BIOTECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH. 
Given what has been presented in this work up to this point, there are 
five recommendations that could be made to provide a framework for 
greater harmonization in the area of stem cell research, narrowly, and 
biotechnological research, generally, in the EU. First, the EPC could be 
amended so that the ECJ has jurisdiction over the decisions of the EPO 
and its judicial organs in a manner similar to when an EU member-state’s 
national court refers a question of EU law to the ECJ. The amendment 
would require that the ECJ serve as the final arbiter of patent law in all 
EPC member-states and would therefore also become the court of last 
resort after either the BOAEPO and the EPAEPO have made a decision. 
This would, of course, require the member-states of the EPC, that are not 
member-states of the EU, to agree to the ECJ’s jurisdiction in matters of 
patent law. Although these non-EU member-states may view this step as 
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a significant limitation on their sovereignty, the trade-off and benefit to 
these member-states is that patent law would become more harmonious 
to the point whereby firms abroad may be more comfortable investing in 
those non-EU member-states and, relatedly, these investors will know 
that patent rights are identical across the EU. Already found within the 
body of case law from the ECJ that supports this point is a requirement 
by the ECJ in Commission v. Italy that patent law be clear and concise 
allowing inventors to have knowledge of their rights and obligations.510 
Such a reality could spur foreign direct investment across several 
neighboring countries by firms that find such countries an attractive 
marketplace for their biotechnological goods.  
Second, and controversially, both the EPC and the TFEU could be 
amended to remove the public order and morality clauses from each 
agreement. This clause, found in EPC Article 53 and in Directive 
98/44/EC Article 3, could be removed from the text of each document as 
this clause seems to create the most leeway for a member-state to engage 
in actions that would disrupt harmony in the field of stem cell and 
biotechnological patentability. Without question, this clause was placed 
in each document, as is the case also with the TRIPS Agreement, to satiate 
the concerns of member-states that wish to protect their own cultures 
within the scope of patent law as it applies to biotechnology. However, 
the removal of this clause would focus patent law as it applies to 
biotechnological patents, to issues such as cloning and genetic 
sequences— both of which are issues that are much more standardized in 
contrast to the much more flexible concepts of public order and morality. 
In other words, these more concrete concepts would be much easier to 
harmonize across a block of countries in contrast to concepts such as 
public order and morality which are not only flexible in the instant, but 
could also change based on social and political considerations over time.  
Third, even if the public order and morality clauses were not removed 
from the corpus of patent law that governs biotechnological inventions 
across EU member-states, the ECJ should rethink its decision in Brustle, 
where the ECJ stated that despite the need for a uniform definition of a 
human embryo, national courts are free to use their own recognition of 
scientific knowledge to make such determinations.511 Judicial bodies are 
almost never immune from political pressure—regardless of member-
states’ efforts to insulate their judiciaries from politics. If the national 
courts of EU member-states are free to use their own sense of scientific 
knowledge, then political pressures could certainly sway a national court 
to find a body of scientific knowledge to support the end result. Rather, 
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the ECJ should move to an international sense of scientific knowledge 
that would both harmonize law and science across the member-states, but 
also further immunize national courts from political pressure. 
A fourth recommendation, and also one of judicial reconsideration, is 
for the ECJ to reevaluate its decision in CopyGene. The ECJ held in 
CopyGene that member-states are free to determine whether specific 
research activities fall within the scope of the VAT tax exception.512 Much 
like a member-state’s ability to determine its own sense of science to 
define a human embryo, the ability of a member-state to freely decide 
what is and what is not exempt from VAT equally allows member-states 
to judge whether certain activities, in this case biological research 
activities, are within the scope of their social and political cultures. A lack 
of VAT exemption might create a financial chilling effect on some 
biological research activities to the point where such activities are no 
longer viable in that member-state, and perhaps worse, pushes those 
research endeavors either to another member-state or to another country 
that is not a member-state of the EU. Admittedly, if the ECJ removed this 
level of home rule for member-states and replaced it with a harmonized 
rule as to whether certain biological research activities are within the 
scope of a VAT exemption, some of this research activity could leave the 
EU. However, if the mission is to increase harmonization, at least 
member-states would not work as rivals to either attract, or push out, the 
investment that supports biotechnological research. It should also be 
mentioned that the European Parliament and European Council could also 
do away with this level of discretion for member-states by amending the 
VAT tax directive. 
The fifth and final recommendation is to shift the ethical debate in the 
area of stem cell research and patentability from the issue of patentability 
to funding. As stated above, the approach to patentability in the U.S. is 
one of agnostic nature whereby assuming the invention, biotechnological 
or otherwise, meets the basic criteria for patentability, there is no 
judgment associated with public order or morality. Although one could 
take the position that the award of a patent represents society’s approval 
of the invention, perhaps the ethical debate should shift to whether 
member-state governments should provide funding for such 
biotechnological inventions either directly or indirectly through a tax 
subsidy. If this were the case, member-states would be using the power of 
the purse to determine society’s approval instead of the potential award 
of patentability. If this framework were adopted by a member-states of 
the EU and the EPC, then a denial of public funding would serve as a 
determinant of economic development rather than EPC Article 53 and/or 
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Directive 98/44/EC. 
IX. CONCLUSION. 
Despite the attempts various institutions, including member-state 
governments of the EU and the EPC, and the EU itself, the ethical debate 
concerning the use of stem cells, human embryos and the patenting, 
funding, and research associated with stem cells and human embryos is 
unlikely to fade as any new stem cell-related invention on the European 
continent may be challenged on morality grounds.513 Just recently, 
scientists have crafted hybrid embryos possessing both human and animal 
cells, called chimeras, in an attempt to grow human organs in such 
animals with the potential for later transplant into human patients.514 A 
new law in the United States, dubbed “The Right to Try Law,” is designed 
to both increase the speed by which patients at grave risk of loss of life 
including those that can benefit from stem cell-based pharmaceuticals can 
access new therapies and legally protect the makers of those 
pharmaceuticals.515 One can also imagine an ethics debate on the liability 
of firms crafting such pharmaceuticals and related therapies. A further 
ethical dilemma concerns the price at which these newly-found and 
successful stem cell therapies, which help researchers and medical 
professionals attack the most challenging illnesses, are distributed to 
patients.516 
Intellectual property rights can assist countries with economic 
development, if their intellectual property regimes are trustworthy.517 The 
lack of harmonization in the law governing stem cell research is 
problematic if the industry is to continue to grow in Europe. . A high level 
of intellectual property protection makes firms more comfortable when 
deciding to invest in another country.518 Reliable intellectual property 
protection will allow a country to enjoy greater technology transfer, lower 
wage inequality, and greater economic development.519 To be fair, there 
is also an argument that developing countries actually experience 
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situations whereby intellectual property rights found inside international 
agreements can serve as a constraint on economic growth.520 Assuming 
that the overwhelming majority of member-states, that maintain 
membership in the EU or the EPO, desire economic development, the case 
law presented in this work depicts both challenges and opportunities. The 
ECJ in International Stem Cell recognized the balance between the 
interests that a member-state may have in growing the economy, to which 
maintaining a patentability regime more open to stem cell research may 
produce. It also recognized the need for protecting human dignity, which 
may reduce the scope of what type of biotechnological inventions are 
patent eligible.521 Problematically, the balance between economic 
development and the advancement of science in the area of stem cell and 
biotechnological research, and the potential harm these scientific 
advancements could bring, is not a balance where all member-states 
within the EU and EPC recognize a middle ground. 
International treaties providing for intellectual property protection are 
increasing in number.522 The EU and the EPO have clearly made great 
strides over the last four decades in an attempt to create a reliable, 
consistent body of law on the subject of biotechnology, generally, and to 
stem cell research, specifically. Without question, EPC Article 53 and 
Directive 98/44/EC were compromises designed to harmonize the law on 
stem cell and biotechnological inventions and to find as much agreement 
as possible among many member-states. However, as the case law and 
morality issues showcased in this work reflect, the compromise may be 
too large a gulf to harmonize the law on stem cell and related 
biotechnological research, without the ECJ directing its jurisprudence 
toward legal flexibility for the member-states. 
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